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Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2018 08:54:10 +0800
From: Alex Shi <alex.shi@...aro.org>
To: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>, Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/45] arm Spectre fix backport review for LTS 4.9
On 03/02/2018 06:30 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 02, 2018 at 05:02:32PM +0800, Alex Shi wrote:
>> As testing the spectre bug fix, that's a good question. I also asked
>> this question to original patch authors, like Marc. They said they just
>> figure out these patches could block spectre or meltdown issue. From my
>> side, I just reproduced the process internal spectre. But all fix on arm
>> can not resolve the user space internal spectre. It can block from user
>> to kernel or kernel to user spectre according the code purose. So I
>> believe these patch could do their job. And arm cpu would drop the
>> spectre branches if it has 20+ 'nop' instructions...
>
> Since this is archived on a public list and I don't want people to rely on
> this, no, you cannot rely on "20+ 'nop' instructions" to work around
> spectre on arm/arm64. It might prevent a particular PoC working on a
> particular SoC, but it's fragile at best.
>
Thanks for comments, Will!
Yes, I full understand the difference between SoCs. Thanks for point it out!
Regards
Alex
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