[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20180305162610.37510-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 19:25:48 +0300
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFC, PATCH 00/22] Partial MKTME enabling
Hi everybody,
Here's updated version of my patchset that brings support of MKTME.
It's not yet complete, but I think it worth sharing to get early feedback.
Things that are missing:
- kmap() is not yet wired up to support tempoprary mappings of encrypted
pages. It's requried to allow kernel to access encrypted memory.
- Interface to manipulate encryption keys.
- Interface to create encrypted userspace mappings.
- IOMMU support.
What has been done:
- PCONFIG, TME and MKTME enumeration.
- In-kernel helper that allows to program encryption keys into CPU.
- Allocation and freeing encrypted pages.
- Helpers to find out if a VMA/anon_vma/page is encrypted and with what
KeyID.
Any feedback is welcome.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multikey Total Memory Encryption (MKTME)[1] is a technology that allows
transparent memory encryption in upcoming Intel platforms.
MKTME is built on top of TME. TME allows encryption of the entirety of
system memory using a single key. MKTME allows to have multiple encryption
domains, each having own key -- different memory pages can be encrypted
with different keys.
Key design points of Intel MKTME:
- Initial HW implementation would support upto 63 keys (plus one default
TME key). But the number of keys may be as low as 3, depending to SKU
and BIOS settings
- To access encrypted memory you need to use mapping with proper KeyID
int the page table entry. KeyID is encoded in upper bits of PFN in page
table entry.
This means we cannot use direct map to access encrypted memory from
kernel side. My idea is to re-use kmap() interface to get proper
temporary mapping on kernel side.
- CPU does not enforce coherency between mappings of the same physical
page with different KeyIDs or encryption keys. We wound need to take
care about flushing cache on allocation of encrypted page and on
returning it back to free pool.
- For managing keys, there's MKTME_KEY_PROGRAM leaf of the new PCONFIG
(platform configuration) instruction. It allows load and clear keys
associated with a KeyID. You can also ask CPU to generate a key for
you or disable memory encryption when a KeyID is used.
[1] https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/a5/16/Multi-Key-Total-Memory-Encryption-Spec.pdf
Kirill A. Shutemov (22):
x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel Total Memory Encryption cpufeature
x86/tme: Detect if TME and MKTME is activated by BIOS
x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel PCONFIG cpufeature
x86/pconfig: Detect PCONFIG targets
x86/pconfig: Provide defines and helper to run MKTME_KEY_PROG leaf
x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME
x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn
mm: Introduce __GFP_ENCRYPT
mm, rmap: Add arch-specific field into anon_vma
mm/shmem: Zero out unused vma fields in shmem_pseudo_vma_init()
mm: Use __GFP_ENCRYPT for pages in encrypted VMAs
mm: Do no merge vma with different encryption KeyIDs
mm, rmap: Free encrypted pages once mapcount drops to zero
mm, khugepaged: Do not collapse pages in encrypted VMAs
x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs
x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify()
x86/mm: Implement vma_is_encrypted() and vma_keyid()
x86/mm: Handle allocation of encrypted pages
x86/mm: Implement free_encrypt_page()
x86/mm: Implement anon_vma_encrypted() and anon_vma_keyid()
x86/mm: Introduce page_keyid() and page_encrypted()
x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME
arch/x86/Kconfig | 21 +++++++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pconfig.h | 65 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h | 56 +++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/page.h | 13 +++-
arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h | 8 ++-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 7 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_pconfig.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 +
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 3 +
arch/x86/mm/mktme.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 5 ++
include/linux/gfp.h | 29 +++++++--
include/linux/mm.h | 17 +++++
include/linux/rmap.h | 6 ++
include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 1 +
mm/Kconfig | 3 +
mm/khugepaged.c | 2 +
mm/mempolicy.c | 3 +
mm/mmap.c | 3 +-
mm/page_alloc.c | 3 +
mm/rmap.c | 49 +++++++++++++--
mm/shmem.c | 3 +-
tools/perf/builtin-kmem.c | 1 +
27 files changed, 590 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pconfig.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_pconfig.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mktme.c
--
2.16.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists