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Message-ID: <679089bb-c0ac-ff68-71b1-1813d66c6aa7@digikod.net>
Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 23:28:24 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 08/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
On 28/02/2018 01:09, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:00 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>
>> On 28/02/2018 00:23, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:14 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think you're wrong here. Any sane container trying to use Landlock
>>>> like this would also create a PID namespace. Problem solved. I still
>>>> think you should drop this patch.
>>
>> Containers is one use case, another is build-in sandboxing (e.g. for web
>> browser…) and another one is for sandbox managers (e.g. Firejail,
>> Bubblewrap, Flatpack…). In some of these use cases, especially from a
>> developer point of view, you may want/need to debug your applications
>> (without requiring to be root). For nested Landlock access-controls
>> (e.g. container + user session + web browser), it may not be allowed to
>> create a PID namespace, but you still want to have a meaningful
>> access-control.
>>
>
> The consideration should be exactly the same as for normal seccomp.
> If I'm in a container (using PID namespaces + seccomp) and a run a web
> browser, I can debug the browser.
>
> If there's a real use case for adding this type of automatic ptrace
> protection, then by all means, let's add it as a general seccomp
> feature.
>
Right, it makes sense to add this feature to seccomp filters as well.
What do you think Kees?
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