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Message-Id: <20180307214624.D4361772@viggo.jf.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2018 13:46:24 -0800
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
dan.j.williams@...el.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk, aarcange@...hat.com, luto@...nel.org,
keescook@...gle.com, tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, corbet@....net, mark.rutland@....com
Subject: [PATCH] [v2] docs: clarify security-bugs disclosure policy
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
I think we need to soften the language a bit. It might scare folks
off, especially the:
We prefer to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible.
which is not really the case. Linus says:
It's not full disclosure, it's not coordinated disclosure,
and it's not "no disclosure". It's more like just "timely
open fixes".
I changed a bit of the wording in here, but mostly to remove the word
"disclosure" since it seems to mean very specific things to people
that we do not mean here.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
---
b/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst | 24 +++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff -puN Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst~embargo2 Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst~embargo2 2018-03-07 13:23:49.390228208 -0800
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst 2018-03-07 13:42:37.618225395 -0800
@@ -29,18 +29,20 @@ made public.
Disclosure
----------
-The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the
-bug submitter to bug resolution as well as disclosure. We prefer
-to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible. It is reasonable to
-delay disclosure when the bug or the fix is not yet fully understood,
-the solution is not well-tested or for vendor coordination. However, we
-expect these delays to be short, measurable in days, not weeks or months.
-A disclosure date is negotiated by the security team working with the
-bug submitter as well as vendors. However, the kernel security team
-holds the final say when setting a disclosure date. The timeframe for
-disclosure is from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known)
+The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the bug
+submitter to understand and fix the bug. We prefer to publish the fix as
+soon as possible, but try to avoid public discussion of the bug itself
+and leave that to others.
+
+Publishing the fix may be delayed when the bug or the fix is not yet
+fully understood, the solution is not well-tested or for vendor
+coordination. However, we expect these delays to be short, measurable in
+days, not weeks or months. A release date is negotiated by the security
+team working with the bug submitter as well as vendors. However, the
+kernel security team holds the final say when setting a timeframe. The
+timeframe varies from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known bug)
to a few weeks. As a basic default policy, we expect report date to
-disclosure date to be on the order of 7 days.
+release date to be on the order of 7 days.
Coordination
------------
_
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