linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load

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Date:   Wed, 07 Mar 2018 08:18:02 -0500
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:     Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        keyrings@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     matthew.garrett@...ula.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load

On Tue, 2018-03-06 at 15:05 +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> On 11/16/2016, 07:10 PM, David Howells wrote:
> > Here are two sets of patches.  Firstly, the first three patches provide a
> > blacklist, making the following changes:
> ...
> > Secondly, the remaining patches allow the UEFI database to be used to load
> > the system keyrings:
> ...
> > Dave Howells (2):
> >       efi: Add EFI signature data types
> >       efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
> > 
> > David Howells (5):
> >       KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring
> >       X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted
> >       PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates
> >       KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
> >       efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
> > 
> > Josh Boyer (2):
> >       MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
> >       MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
> 
> Hi,
> 
> what's the status of this please? Distributors (I checked SUSE, RedHat
> and Ubuntu) have to carry these patches and every of them have to
> forward-port the patches to new kernels. So are you going to resend the
> PR to have this merged?

With secure boot enabled, we establish a signature chain of trust,
rooted in HW, up to the kernel and then transition from those keys to
a new set of keys builtin the kernel and loaded onto the
builtin_trusted_keys (builtin).

Enabling the secondary_builtin_keys (secondary) allows keys signed by
a key on the builtin keyring to be added to the secondary keyring.
 Any key, signed by a key on either the builtin or secondary keyring,
can be added to the IMA trusted keyring.

The "KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary
keyring" patch loads the platform keys directly onto the secondary
keyring, without requiring them to be signed by a key on the builtin
or secondary keyring.  With this change, any key signed by a platfrom
key on the secondary, can be loaded onto the .ima trusted keyring.

Just because I trust the platform keys prior to booting the kernel,
doesn't mean that I *want* to trust those keys once booted.  There
are, however, places where we need access to those keys to verify a
signature (eg. kexec kernel image).

Nayna Jain's "certs: define a trusted platform keyring" patch set
introduces a new, separate keyring for these platform keys.

Mimi