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Message-ID: <77914ffc-9145-cc9f-a36c-f1ab84724915@schaufler-ca.com>
Date:   Wed, 7 Mar 2018 09:59:49 -0800
From:   Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:     Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp, keescook@...omium.org,
        igor.stoppa@...wei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] security: Expose a mechanism to load lsm hooks
 dynamically at runtime

On 3/6/2018 11:23 PM, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> This patch adds dynamic security hooks. These hooks are designed to allow
> for safe runtime loading.
>
> These hooks are only run after all built-in, and major LSMs are run.
> The LSMs enabled by this feature must be minor LSMs, but they can poke
> at the security blobs, as the blobs should be initialized by the time
> their callback happens.
>
> There should be little runtime performance overhead for this feature,
> as it's protected behind static_keys, which are disabled by default,
> and are only enabled per-hook at runtime, when a module is loaded.
>
> Currently, the hook heads are separated for dynamic hooks, because
> it is not read-only like the hooks which are loaded at runtime.
>
> Some hooks are blacklisted, and attempting to load an LSM with any
> of them in use will fail.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  26 +++++-
>  security/Kconfig          |   9 +++
>  security/inode.c          |  13 ++-
>  security/security.c       | 198 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  4 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index d28c7f5b01c1..4e6351957dff 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
>  #include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <linux/init.h>
>  #include <linux/rculist.h>
> +#include <linux/module.h>
>  
>  /**
>   * union security_list_options - Linux Security Module hook function list
> @@ -1968,6 +1969,9 @@ struct security_hook_list {
>  	enum lsm_hook			head_idx;
>  	union security_list_options	hook;
>  	char				*lsm;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_HOOKS
> +	struct module			*owner;
> +#endif
>  } __randomize_layout;
>  
>  /*
> @@ -1976,11 +1980,29 @@ struct security_hook_list {
>   * care of the common case and reduces the amount of
>   * text involved.
>   */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_HOOKS
> +#define LSM_HOOK_INIT(HEAD, HOOK)		\
> +	{					\
> +		.head_idx = HOOK_IDX(HEAD),	\
> +		.hook = { .HEAD = HOOK },	\
> +		.owner = THIS_MODULE,		\
> +	}
> +
> +#else
>  #define LSM_HOOK_INIT(HEAD, HOOK) \
>  	{ .head_idx = HOOK_IDX(HEAD), .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } }
> +#endif
>  
> -extern char *lsm_names;
> -
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_HOOKS
> +extern int security_add_dynamic_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
> +				      int count, char *lsm);
> +#else
> +static inline int security_add_dynamic_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
> +					     int count, char *lsm)
> +{
> +	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
> +#endif
>  extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>  				char *lsm);
>  
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index c4302067a3ad..481b93b0d4d9 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -36,6 +36,15 @@ config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
>  	bool
>  	default n
>  
> +config SECURITY_DYNAMIC_HOOKS
> +	bool "Runtime loadable (minor) LSMs via LKMs"
> +	depends on SECURITY && SRCU
> +	help
> +	  This enables LSMs which live in LKMs, and supports loading, and
> +	  unloading them safely at runtime. These LSMs must be minor LSMs.
> +	  They cannot circumvent the built-in LSMs.
> +	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> +
>  config SECURITYFS
>  	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
>  	help
> diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
> index 8dd9ca8848e4..89be07b044a5 100644
> --- a/security/inode.c
> +++ b/security/inode.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,10 @@
>  #include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
>  #include <linux/magic.h>
> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
> +
> +extern char *lsm_names;
> +extern struct mutex lsm_lock;
>  
>  static struct vfsmount *mount;
>  static int mount_count;
> @@ -312,8 +316,13 @@ static struct dentry *lsm_dentry;
>  static ssize_t lsm_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
>  			loff_t *ppos)
>  {
> -	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, lsm_names,
> -		strlen(lsm_names));
> +	ssize_t ret;
> +
> +	mutex_lock(&lsm_lock);
> +	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, lsm_names,
> +				      strlen(lsm_names));
> +	mutex_unlock(&lsm_lock);
> +	return ret;
>  }
>  
>  static const struct file_operations lsm_ops = {
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index b9fb297b824e..492d44dd0549 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
>  #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
>  #include <linux/string.h>
>  #include <net/flow.h>
> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
>  
>  #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR	2
>  
> @@ -36,10 +37,18 @@
>  #define SECURITY_NAME_MAX	10

I expect that this limit will be too small for loadable modules.

>  static struct list_head security_hook_heads[__MAX_LSM_HOOK] __lsm_ro_after_init;
> -static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
> -
>  #define HOOK_HEAD(NAME)	(&security_hook_heads[HOOK_IDX(NAME)])
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_HOOKS
> +static struct list_head dynamic_security_hook_heads[__MAX_LSM_HOOK];
> +static struct srcu_struct dynamic_hook_srcus[__MAX_LSM_HOOK];
> +#define DYNAMIC_HOOK_HEAD(NAME)	(&dynamic_security_hook_heads[HOOK_IDX(NAME)])
> +#define DYNAMIC_HOOK_SRCU(NAME)	(&dynamic_hook_srcus[HOOK_IDX(NAME)])
> +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_ARRAY_FALSE(dynamic_hook_keys, __MAX_LSM_HOOK);
> +#endif
> +static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
> +
> +DEFINE_MUTEX(lsm_lock);
>  char *lsm_names;
>  /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
>  static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
> @@ -55,6 +64,23 @@ static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_HOOKS
> +static void security_init_dynamic_hooks(void)
> +{
> +	int i, err;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dynamic_security_hook_heads); i++) {
> +		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dynamic_security_hook_heads[i]);
> +		err = init_srcu_struct(&dynamic_hook_srcus[i]);
> +		if (err)
> +			panic("%s: Could not initialize SRCU - %d\n",
> +			      __func__, err);
> +	}
> +}
> +#else
> +static inline void security_init_dynamic_hooks(void) {};
> +#endif
> +
>  /**
>   * security_init - initializes the security framework
>   *
> @@ -66,6 +92,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
>  
>  	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(security_hook_heads); i++)
>  		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads[i]);
> +	security_init_dynamic_hooks();
>  	pr_info("Security Framework initialized\n");
>  
>  	/*
> @@ -172,6 +199,64 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>  		panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
>  }
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_HOOKS
> +static int hook_allowed(enum lsm_hook hook_idx)
> +{
> +	switch (hook_idx) {
> +	case HOOK_IDX(inode_getsecurity):
> +	case HOOK_IDX(inode_setsecurity):
> +	case HOOK_IDX(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match):
> +		return -EPERM;
> +	default:
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +}

Where did this list come from? Why doesn't it include
secid_to_secctx? Why does it include xfrm_stat_pol_flow_match?

> +/**
> + * security_add_dynamic_hooks:
> + *	Register a dynamically loadable module's security hooks.
> + *
> + * @hooks: the hooks to add
> + * @count: the number of hooks to add
> + * @lsm: the name of the security module
> + *
> + * Returns:
> + * 0 if successful
> + * else errno, and no hooks will be installed
> + */
> +int security_add_dynamic_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> +				char *lsm)
> +{
> +	enum lsm_hook hook_idx;
> +	int ret = 0, i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
> +		ret = hook_allowed(hooks[i].head_idx);
> +		if (ret)
> +			return ret;
> +	}
> +
> +	mutex_lock(&lsm_lock);
> +	ret = lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names);
> +	if (ret)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
> +		WARN_ON(!try_module_get(hooks[i].owner));
> +		hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
> +		hook_idx = hooks[i].head_idx;
> +		list_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list,
> +				  &dynamic_security_hook_heads[hook_idx]);
> +		static_branch_enable(&dynamic_hook_keys[hook_idx]);
> +	}
> +
> +out:
> +	mutex_unlock(&lsm_lock);
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_add_dynamic_hooks);
> +#endif
> +
>  int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
>  {
>  	return atomic_notifier_call_chain(&lsm_notifier_chain, event, data);
> @@ -200,14 +285,69 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_lsm_notifier);
>   *	This is a hook that returns a value.
>   */
>  
> -#define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...)				\
> +#define call_void_hook_builtin(FUNC, ...) do {			\
> +	struct security_hook_list *P;				\
> +	list_for_each_entry(P, HOOK_HEAD(FUNC), list)		\
> +		P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);			\
> +} while (0)
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_HOOKS
> +#define IS_DYNAMIC_HOOK_ENABLED(FUNC)				\
> +	(static_branch_unlikely(&dynamic_hook_keys[HOOK_IDX(FUNC)]))
> +
> +#define call_void_hook_dynamic(FUNC, ...) ({			\
> +	struct security_hook_list *P;				\
> +	int idx;						\
> +								\
> +	idx = srcu_read_lock(DYNAMIC_HOOK_SRCU(FUNC));		\
> +	list_for_each_entry_rcu(P,				\
> +				DYNAMIC_HOOK_HEAD(FUNC),	\
> +				list) {				\
> +		P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);			\
> +	}							\
> +	srcu_read_unlock(DYNAMIC_HOOK_SRCU(FUNC), idx);		\

There has got to be a better way to do this than setting a lock
for every hook call.

> +})
> +
> +#define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...)	\
> +	do {				\
> +		call_void_hook_builtin(FUNC, __VA_ARGS__);	\
> +		if (!IS_DYNAMIC_HOOK_ENABLED(FUNC))		\
> +			break;					\

Why not let the list macros do their job?

> +		call_void_hook_dynamic(FUNC, __VA_ARGS__);	\
> +	} while (0)
> +
> +#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({			\
> +	bool continue_iteration = true;				\
> +	int RC = IRC, idx;					\
>  	do {							\
>  		struct security_hook_list *P;			\
>  								\
> -		list_for_each_entry(P, HOOK_HEAD(FUNC), list)	\
> -			P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);		\
> -	} while (0)
> +		list_for_each_entry(P, HOOK_HEAD(FUNC), list) { \
> +			RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);		\
> +			if (RC != 0) {				\
> +				continue_iteration = false;	\
> +				break;				\
> +			}					\
> +		}						\
> +		if (!IS_DYNAMIC_HOOK_ENABLED(FUNC))		\
> +			break;					\
> +		if (!continue_iteration)			\
> +			break;					\
> +		idx = srcu_read_lock(DYNAMIC_HOOK_SRCU(FUNC));	\
> +		list_for_each_entry_rcu(P,			\
> +					DYNAMIC_HOOK_HEAD(FUNC), \
> +					list) {			\
> +			RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);		\
> +			if (RC != 0)				\
> +				break;				\
> +		}						\
> +		srcu_read_unlock(DYNAMIC_HOOK_SRCU(FUNC), idx);	\
> +	} while (0);						\
> +	RC;							\
> +})
>  
> +#else
> +#define call_void_hook	call_void_hook_builtin

I think this is hideous.

>  #define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({			\
>  	int RC = IRC;						\
>  	do {							\
> @@ -221,6 +361,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_lsm_notifier);
>  	} while (0);						\
>  	RC;							\
>  })
> +#endif
>  
>  /* Security operations */
>  
> @@ -312,6 +453,9 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
>  	int cap_sys_admin = 1;
>  	int rc;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_HOOKS
> +	int idx;
> +#endif
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * The module will respond with a positive value if
> @@ -324,9 +468,25 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
>  		rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
>  		if (rc <= 0) {
>  			cap_sys_admin = 0;
> -			break;
> +			goto out;
>  		}
>  	}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_HOOKS
> +	if (!IS_DYNAMIC_HOOK_ENABLED(vm_enough_memory))
> +		goto out;
> +	idx = srcu_read_lock(DYNAMIC_HOOK_SRCU(vm_enough_memory));
> +	list_for_each_entry_rcu(hp, DYNAMIC_HOOK_HEAD(vm_enough_memory),
> +				list) {
> +		rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
> +		if (rc <= 0) {
> +			cap_sys_admin = 0;
> +			goto out;
> +		}
> +	}
> +	srcu_read_unlock(DYNAMIC_HOOK_SRCU(vm_enough_memory), idx);
> +#endif
> +out:
>  	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
>  }
>  
> @@ -1128,15 +1288,36 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
>  	int thisrc;
>  	int rc = -ENOSYS;
>  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_HOOKS
> +	int idx;
> +#endif
>  
>  	list_for_each_entry(hp, HOOK_HEAD(task_prctl), list) {
>  		thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
>  		if (thisrc != -ENOSYS) {
>  			rc = thisrc;
>  			if (thisrc != 0)
> -				break;
> +				goto out;
>  		}
>  	}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_HOOKS
> +	if (!IS_DYNAMIC_HOOK_ENABLED(task_prctl))
> +		goto out;
> +	idx = srcu_read_lock(DYNAMIC_HOOK_SRCU(task_prctl));
> +	list_for_each_entry_rcu(hp, DYNAMIC_HOOK_HEAD(task_prctl),
> +				list) {
> +		thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
> +		if (thisrc != -ENOSYS) {
> +			rc = thisrc;
> +			if (thisrc != 0)
> +				goto out_unlock;
> +		}
> +	}
> +out_unlock:
> +	srcu_read_unlock(DYNAMIC_HOOK_SRCU(task_prctl), idx);
> +#endif
> +out:
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> @@ -1636,6 +1817,7 @@ int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
>  		rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl);
>  		break;
>  	}
> +
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  

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