[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20180309190736.GA4657@beast>
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 11:07:36 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Subject: [PATCH] exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check
The LSM check should happen after the file has been confirmed to be
unchanging. Without this, we could have a ToCToU issue between the
LSM verification and the actual contents of the file later.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
Only loadpin and SELinux implement this hook. From what I can see, this
won't change anything for either of them. IMA calls kernel_read_file(),
but looking there it seems those callers won't be negatively impacted
either. Can folks double-check this and send an Ack please?
---
fs/exec.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 7eb8d21bcab9..a919a827d181 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -895,13 +895,13 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
+ ret = deny_write_access(file);
if (ret)
return ret;
- ret = deny_write_access(file);
+ ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
if (ret)
- return ret;
+ goto out;
i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size) {
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists