linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.2 042/104] x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors

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Message-ID: <lsq.1520823814.697207786@decadent.org.uk>
Date:   Mon, 12 Mar 2018 03:03:34 +0000
From:   Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        "Borislav Petkov" <bp@...e.de>,
        "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@...nel.org>,
        "Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.2 042/104] x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD
 processors

3.2.101-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>

commit 694d99d40972f12e59a3696effee8a376b79d7c8 upstream.

AMD processors are not subject to the types of attacks that the kernel
page table isolation feature protects against.  The AMD microarchitecture
does not allow memory references, including speculative references, that
access higher privileged data when running in a lesser privileged mode
when that access would result in a page fault.

Disable page table isolation by default on AMD processors by not setting
the X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE feature, which controls whether X86_FEATURE_PTI
is set.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171227054354.20369.94587.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -768,8 +768,8 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
 	if (this_cpu->c_bsp_init)
 		this_cpu->c_bsp_init(c);
 
-	/* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
-	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
+	if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
 }
 
 void __init early_cpu_init(void)