linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.2 095/104] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS

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Message-ID: <lsq.1520823814.692314103@decadent.org.uk>
Date:   Mon, 12 Mar 2018 03:03:34 +0000
From:   Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, "Andi Kleen" <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        "David Woodhouse" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        "Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        "Borislav Petkov" <bp@...en8.de>,
        "Darren Kenny" <darren.kenny@...cle.com>,
        "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        "Arjan van de Ven" <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 3.2 095/104] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which
 should be IBRS_ALL

3.2.101-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>

commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881 upstream.

Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_size[];
  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
  */
 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 {