linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.9 54/86] netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks

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Message-Id: <20180316152321.040192570@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:23:17 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
        Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
        Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 54/86] netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>

commit 57ebd808a97d7c5b1e1afb937c2db22beba3c1f8 upstream.

The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.

In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.

However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.

IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.

If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.

Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c |    4 ++++
 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c  |    7 ++++++-
 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c |    4 ++++
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -261,6 +261,10 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buf
 			}
 			if (table_base + v
 			    != arpt_next_entry(e)) {
+				if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
+					verdict = NF_DROP;
+					break;
+				}
 				jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
 			}
 
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -345,8 +345,13 @@ ipt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				continue;
 			}
 			if (table_base + v != ipt_next_entry(e) &&
-			    !(e->ip.flags & IPT_F_GOTO))
+			    !(e->ip.flags & IPT_F_GOTO)) {
+				if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
+					verdict = NF_DROP;
+					break;
+				}
 				jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
+			}
 
 			e = get_entry(table_base, v);
 			continue;
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -376,6 +376,10 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			}
 			if (table_base + v != ip6t_next_entry(e) &&
 			    !(e->ipv6.flags & IP6T_F_GOTO)) {
+				if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
+					verdict = NF_DROP;
+					break;
+				}
 				jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
 			}