[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20180319155742.13731-107-alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 15:59:59 +0000
From: Sasha Levin <Alexander.Levin@...rosoft.com>
To: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"stable@...r.kernel.org" <stable@...r.kernel.org>
CC: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@...il.com>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
Sasha Levin <Alexander.Levin@...rosoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL for 4.9 107/281] fix race in
drivers/char/random.c:get_reg()
From: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@...il.com>
[ Upstream commit 9dfa7bba35ac08a63565d58c454dccb7e1bb0a08 ]
get_reg() can be reentered on architectures with prioritized interrupts
(m68k in this case), causing f->reg_index to be incremented after the
range check. Out of bounds memory access past the pt_regs struct results.
This will go mostly undetected unless access is beyond end of memory.
Prevent the race by disabling interrupts in get_reg().
Tested on m68k (Atari Falcon, and ARAnyM emulator).
Kudos to Geert Uytterhoeven for helping to trace this race.
Signed-off-by: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 08d1dd58c0d2..23f3fb45ff07 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1115,12 +1115,16 @@ static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start)
static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
__u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs;
+ unsigned long flags;
if (regs == NULL)
return 0;
+ local_irq_save(flags);
if (f->reg_idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32))
f->reg_idx = 0;
- return *(ptr + f->reg_idx++);
+ ptr += f->reg_idx++;
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ return *ptr;
}
void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
--
2.14.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists