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Message-ID: <CALCETrWU4KDu+3U2Z6XpLcV5G9-ihesCdREdaGtO76spuHW-mA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 02:13:25 +0000
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Howard McLauchlan <hmclauchlan@...com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>,
kernel-team <kernel-team@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] bpf: whitelist syscalls for error injection
On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 6:47 AM, Dominik Brodowski
<linux@...inikbrodowski.net> wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 03:55:04PM -0700, Howard McLauchlan wrote:
>> On 03/13/2018 04:56 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> > On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 11:16 PM, Howard McLauchlan <hmclauchlan@...com> wrote:
>> >> Error injection is a useful mechanism to fail arbitrary kernel
>> >> functions. However, it is often hard to guarantee an error propagates
>> >> appropriately to user space programs. By injecting into syscalls, we can
>> >> return arbitrary values to user space directly; this increases
>> >> flexibility and robustness in testing, allowing us to test user space
>> >> error paths effectively.
>> >
>> > Temporary NAK IMO. Specifically:
>> >
>> >> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
>> >> index a78186d826d7..e8c6d63ace78 100644
>> >> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
>> >> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
>> >> @@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ static inline int is_syscall_trace_event(struct trace_event_call *tp_event)
>> >>
>> >> #define SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sname) \
>> >> SYSCALL_METADATA(_##sname, 0); \
>> >> + asmlinkage long sys_##sname(void); \
>> >> + ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION(sys_##sname, ERRNO); \
>> >
>> > sys_xyz() is not just the syscall itself; it's also a helper that's
>> > used for entirely silly reasons by various bits of kernel code for
>> > quite a few syscalls. Fortunately, Dominik has patches to fix that,
>> > and Linus is even considering pulling them for 4.16. This patch will
>> > most likely conflict with the final result of Dominik's series.
>> >
>> > Can you and Dominik coordinate a bit to get this patch or its
>> > equivalent landed on top of Dominik's work? It might make sense for
>> > Dominik to just add this patch to his series so it can land with the
>> > rest of it. Dominik, Ingo, what do you think?
>> >
>> > --Andy
>> >
>>
>> Dominik,
>>
>> This patch applies cleanly on top of your patch series. Is there anything you'd need from me to get this in on top of your work?
>
> Howard,
>
> would this form part of the kernel<->userspace interface and therefore needs
> to be kept stable? If so, this patch should wait until the arch-specific
> syscall calling convention is agreed upon.
>
> Moreover, the patches I sent out already do not cover all syscalls yet.
> Until all in-kernel users of sys_*() are gone (or at least outside arch/),
> I'd prefer to postpone this patch.
>
I was assuming that this ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION thing is *not*
considered stable ABI. We should be free to change the way that the
syscall entry code calls syscalls whenever we like.
If you want a stable syscall error injection mechanism, make it work
like seccomp instead, please.
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