linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 13/15] x86/fsgsbase/64: With FSGSBASE, compare GS bases on paranoid

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Date:   Wed, 21 Mar 2018 00:36:10 +0000
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To:     "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc:     David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
        "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "luto@...nel.org" <luto@...nel.org>,
        "ak@...ux.intel.com" <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        "markus.t.metzger@...el.com" <markus.t.metzger@...el.com>,
        "tony.luck@...el.com" <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        "ravi.v.shankar@...el.com" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 13/15] x86/fsgsbase/64: With FSGSBASE, compare GS bases on paranoid_entry

On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 8:07 PM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote:
> On 03/20/18 03:16, David Laight wrote:
>> From: Chang S. Bae
>>> Sent: 19 March 2018 17:49
>> ...
>>> When FSGSBASE is enabled, SWAPGS needs if and only if (current)
>>> GS base is not the kernel's.
>>>
>>> FSGSBASE instructions allow user to write any value on GS base;
>>> even negative. Sign check on the current GS base is not
>>> sufficient. Fortunately, reading GS base is fast. Kernel GS
>>> base is also known from the offset table with the CPU number.
>> ...
>>
>> Use code might want to put a negative value into GSBASE.
>> While it is normal to put a valid address into GSBASE there
>> is no reason why the code can't put an offset into GSBASE,
>> in which case it might be negative.
>>
>> Yes, I know you can't put arbitrary 64bit values into GSBASE.
>> But the difference between 2 user pointers will always be valid.
>>
>
> You don't have a choice: you can't control what userspace puts in there.
>  Anything that depends on a specific value is inherently unsafe.
>
> But we also don't need swapgs when we have rdgsbase/wrgsbase available.
> We can indeed just unconditionally save it (via rdgsbase) into the stack
> frame and wrgsbase the correct percpu value.  In that case it might be
> necessary in order to avoid insane complexity to also save/restore the
> gs selector.

This is exactly what the old code did.  I liked the old code better.

>
> Is it going to be faster?  *Probably* not as swapgs is designed to be
> fast; it does, however, eliminate the need to RDMSR/WRMSR inside the
> kernel task switch as the user space gsbase will simply live on the
> stack.  (This is assuming we do this unconditionally on every method of
> kernel entry, including non-paranoid.  I'm not sure if we ever care
> about the userspace GS/GSBASE inside a paranoid handler, but if we do it
> would be rather messy to find if we do this conditionally.
>
> Now...
>
> +       ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lparanoid_entry_no_fsgsbase", \
> +               "RDGSBASE %rdx", X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE
> +       READ_KERNEL_GSBASE %rax
>
> READ_KERNEL_GSBASE here seems like a Really Bad Name[TM] for this macro,
> since it seems to imply reading MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, rather than finding
> the current percpu offset.  I would prefer calling it something like
> FIND_PERCPU_BASE or something like that.

I think we should revert to what the old patches did here.