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Message-Id: <B217D90A-6200-4257-804A-50D6C0308470@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 21:48:22 +0300
From: Ilya Smith <blackzert@...il.com>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>,
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.
> On 28 Mar 2018, at 01:16, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@....edu> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 04:51:08PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>> /dev/[u]random is not sufficient?
>>
>> Using /dev/[u]random makes 3 syscalls - open, read, close. This is a performance
>> issue.
>
> You may want to take a look at the getrandom(2) system call, which is
> the recommended way getting secure random numbers from the kernel.
>
>>> Well, I am pretty sure userspace can implement proper free ranges
>>> tracking…
>>
>> I think we need to know what libc developers will say on implementing ASLR in
>> user-mode. I am pretty sure they will say ‘nether’ or ‘some-day’. And problem
>> of ASLR will stay forever.
>
> Why can't you send patches to the libc developers?
>
> Regards,
>
> - Ted
I still believe the issue is on kernel side, not in library.
Best regards,
Ilya
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