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Message-Id: <1522766345-4169-1-git-send-email-daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Date:   Tue,  3 Apr 2018 16:39:05 +0200
From:   Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@...cle.com>
To:     linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        x86@...nel.org, xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org
Cc:     ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org, boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com,
        eric.snowberg@...cle.com, hpa@...or.com, jgross@...e.com,
        konrad.wilk@...cle.com, mingo@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de
Subject: [PATCH v2] x86/xen/efi: Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot

Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot. Otherwise the kernel
may not even know that it runs on secure boot enabled platform.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@...cle.com>
---
 arch/x86/xen/efi.c                        |   57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c |    3 ++
 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/efi.c b/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
index a18703b..1804b27 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
@@ -115,6 +115,61 @@ static efi_system_table_t __init *xen_efi_probe(void)
 	return &efi_systab_xen;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
+ *
+ * Please keep the logic in sync with
+ * drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:efi_get_secureboot().
+ */
+static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+	static efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+	static efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+	efi_status_t status;
+	u8 moksbstate, secboot, setupmode;
+	unsigned long size;
+
+	size = sizeof(secboot);
+	status = efi.get_variable(L"SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
+				  NULL, &size, &secboot);
+
+	if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+		return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		goto out_efi_err;
+
+	size = sizeof(setupmode);
+	status = efi.get_variable(L"SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
+				  NULL, &size, &setupmode);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		goto out_efi_err;
+
+	if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
+		return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+	/* See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. */
+	size = sizeof(moksbstate);
+	status = efi.get_variable(L"MokSBStateRT", &shim_guid,
+				  NULL, &size, &moksbstate);
+
+	/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		goto secure_boot_enabled;
+
+	if (moksbstate == 1)
+		return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+ secure_boot_enabled:
+	pr_info("UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
+	return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
+
+ out_efi_err:
+	pr_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
+	return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+}
+
 void __init xen_efi_init(void)
 {
 	efi_system_table_t *efi_systab_xen;
@@ -129,6 +184,8 @@ void __init xen_efi_init(void)
 	boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab = (__u32)__pa(efi_systab_xen);
 	boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab_hi = (__u32)(__pa(efi_systab_xen) >> 32);
 
+	boot_params.secure_boot = xen_efi_get_secureboot();
+
 	set_bit(EFI_BOOT, &efi.flags);
 	set_bit(EFI_PARAVIRT, &efi.flags);
 	set_bit(EFI_64BIT, &efi.flags);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
index 8f07eb4..72d9dfb 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@
 
 /*
  * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
+ *
+ * Please keep the logic in sync with
+ * arch/x86/xen/efi.c:xen_efi_get_secureboot().
  */
 enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
 {
-- 
1.7.10.4

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