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Message-ID: <CALCETrWHS9p1My=j07=V=OP7v4SwQkW-kJ3JOx6EbPU8fb_XEQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 12:01:08 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Justin Forbes <jforbes@...hat.com>,
linux-man <linux-man@...r.kernel.org>, joeyli <jlee@...e.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
> On Apr 3, 2018, at 10:16 AM, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
>
>>> A kernel that allows users arbitrary access to ring 0 is just an
>>> overfeatured bootloader. Why would you want secure boot in that case?
>>
>> To get a chain of trust.
>
> You don't have a chain of trust that you can trust in that case.
>
Please elaborate on why I can’t trust it. Please also elaborate on how
lockdown helps at all.
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