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Message-ID: <CACdnJutkO9dgz=HZpPRR9PZC=+cHh97dRUiGB+D3gruZr6U9Kg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 03 Apr 2018 23:47:53 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: luto@...nel.org, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, jmorris@...ei.org,
Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
jforbes@...hat.com, linux-man@...r.kernel.org, jlee@...e.com,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 4:39 PM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 4:26 PM, Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > Magically changing kernel behavior depending on some subtle and often
> > unintentional bootup behavior detail is completely idiotic.
> Another way of looking at this: if lockdown is a good idea to enable
> when you booted using secure boot, then why isn't it a good idea when
> you *didn't* boot using secure boot?
Because it's then trivial to circumvent and the restrictions aren't worth
the benefit.
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