linux-kernel - Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAFbkSA1BT6Ca7ZtcjvCubvtke07ctgMQVo25fcWY4ZTRLKw0pA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 4 Apr 2018 11:46:31 -0500
From:   Justin Forbes <jforbes@...hat.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>, "Ted Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-man <linux-man@...r.kernel.org>, joeyli <jlee@...e.com>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot

On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 11:39 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 6:52 AM Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@....edu> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 02:33:37PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>>> > Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@....edu> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > > Whoa.  Why doesn't lockdown prevent kexec?  Put another away, why
>>> > > isn't this a problem for people who are fearful that Linux could be
>>> > > used as part of a Windows boot virus in a Secure UEFI context?
>>> >
>>> > Lockdown mode restricts kexec to booting an authorised image (where the
>>> > authorisation may be by signature or by IMA).
>>
>>> If that's true, then Matthew's assertion that lockdown w/o secure boot
>>> is insecure goes away, no?
>>
>> If you don't have secure boot then an attacker with root can modify your
>> bootloader or kernel, and on next boot lockdown can be silently disabled.
>
> This has been rebutted over and over and over.  Secure boot is not the
> only verified boot mechanism in the world.  Other, better, much more
> auditable, and much simpler mechanisms have been around for a long,
> long time.
>
That is certainly the case, and one of the main reasons for the
secureboot patchset being split out and lockdown taking a different
name. The problem is, right now, secure boot is the only thing using
lockdown. I certainly wouldn't go through any effort to tie into it
with any other mechanism knowing that this patch set has been delayed
upstream for years. I would hope and expect that once lockdown is in
mainline, other verified boot mechanisms would leverage it as well.

>>> The fact that this Verified Boot on, lockdown off causes trouble
>>> points to a clear problem.   User owns the hardware they should have
>>> the right to defeat secureboot if they wish to.
>>
>> Which is why Shim allows you to disable validation if you prove physical
>> user presence.
>
> And that's a giant hack.  The actual feature should be that a user
> proves physical presence and thus disables lockdown *without*
> disabling verification.
>
> --Andy