linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] [RFC][WIP] namespace.c: Allow some unprivileged proc mounts when not fully visible

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Message-ID: <87k1tmed6b.fsf@xmission.com>
Date:   Wed, 04 Apr 2018 18:59:08 -0500
From:   ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:     Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
Cc:     alban.crequy@...il.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC][WIP] namespace.c: Allow some unprivileged proc mounts when not fully visible

Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com> writes:

>> The only option I have seen proposed that might qualify as something
>> general purpose and simple is a new filesystem that is just the process
>> directories of proc.
>
> While "mount -t pid" and "mount -t sysctl" are decades overdue, I don't
> think they cover everything.
>
> IIRC some gcc versions read /proc/meminfo on every invocation. Now
> imagine such program doesn't have a fallback if /proc/ doesn't exist
> (how many thousands such programs are there?) So user is going to ask
> for /proc with just /proc/meminfo only. At this point it is back to
> nearly full /proc.

To avoid falling susceptible to the kinds of checks in fs_fully_visible we
can only offer information about objects that root in the user namespace
has privilege over.  So "mount -t pid" good.  A "/proc/meminfo" bad.

Which in short means if "mount -t pid" isn't good enough.  There really
isn't anything the kernel can do.

Eric