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Message-ID: <20180408082306.GB4965@amd>
Date: Sun, 8 Apr 2018 10:23:06 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Justin Forbes <jforbes@...hat.com>,
linux-man <linux-man@...r.kernel.org>, joeyli <jlee@...e.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
On Wed 2018-04-04 00:39:05, David Howells wrote:
> Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> > The same thing is true of some lockdown patch. Maybe it's a good thing
> > in general. But whether it's a good thing is _entirely_ independent of
> > any secure boot issue. I can see using secure boot without it, but I
> > can very much also see using lockdown without secure boot.
> >
> > The two things are simply entirely orthogonal. They have _zero_
> > overlap. I'm not seeing why they'd be linked at all in any way.
>
> I'm not sure I agree. Here's my reasoning:
>
> (1) Lockdown mode really needs to activated during kernel boot, before
> userspace has a chance to run, otherwise there's a window of opportunity
> in which the kernel *isn't* locked down.
>
> (2) If the kernel isn't booted in secure boot mode, then there's the
> opportunity to tamper before the kernel even starts booting.
>
> (3) There doesn't seem any point in booting in secure boot mode if you don't
> protect the running kernel image against tampering. What does it mean to
> be in "secure boot mode" in that case? If the kernel can be tampered
> with, it would seem to be, by definition, insecure.
This one is not true, either.
If kernel does "printk(KERN_CRIT "loading unsigned module");
mdelay(10000);", it is useful for secure boot and provides way to
owner to play.
Nokia N9 / N950 uses this kind of "security" for example. It is rather
annoying but better than not being able to run custom kernels at all.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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