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Message-ID: <87in8znaj4.fsf@yhuang-dev.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 08:57:19 +0800
From: "Huang\, Ying" <ying.huang@...el.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: <linux-mm@...ck.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Andrei Vagin <avagin@...nvz.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Jerome Glisse <jglisse@...hat.com>,
Daniel Colascione <dancol@...gle.com>,
Zi Yan <zi.yan@...rutgers.edu>,
Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@...jp.nec.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -mm] mm, pagemap: Fix swap offset value for PMD migration entry
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> writes:
> On Sun, 8 Apr 2018 11:37:37 +0800 "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@...el.com> wrote:
>
>> From: Huang Ying <ying.huang@...el.com>
>>
>> The swap offset reported by /proc/<pid>/pagemap may be not correct for
>> PMD migration entry. If addr passed into pagemap_range() isn't
>
> pagemap_pmd_range(), yes?
Yes. Sorry for typo.
>> aligned with PMD start address,
>
> How can this situation come about?
After open /proc/<pid>/pagemap, if user seeks to a page whose address
doesn't aligned with PMD start address. I have verified this with a
simple test program.
>> the swap offset reported doesn't
>> reflect this. And in the loop to report information of each sub-page,
>> the swap offset isn't increased accordingly as that for PFN.
>>
>> BTW: migration swap entries have PFN information, do we need to
>> restrict whether to show them?
>
> For what reason? Address obfuscation?
This is an existing feature for PFN report of /proc/<pid>/pagemap,
reason is in following commit log. I am wondering whether that is
necessary for migration swap entries too.
ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce
Author: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
AuthorDate: Mon Mar 9 23:11:12 2015 +0200
Commit: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
CommitDate: Tue Mar 17 09:31:30 2015 -0700
pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@...nvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@...omium.org>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Best Regards,
Huang, Ying
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