linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.9 191/310] macsec: check return value of skb_to

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Message-Id: <20180411183630.815104577@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Wed, 11 Apr 2018 20:35:30 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 191/310] macsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>


[ Upstream commit cda7ea6903502af34015000e16be290a79f07638 ]

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/macsec.c |   13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/macsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c
@@ -742,7 +742,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(st
 	macsec_fill_iv(iv, secy->sci, pn);
 
 	sg_init_table(sg, ret);
-	skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
+	ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
+	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
+		macsec_txsa_put(tx_sa);
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
 
 	if (tx_sc->encrypt) {
 		int len = skb->len - macsec_hdr_len(sci_present) -
@@ -949,7 +954,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(st
 	macsec_fill_iv(iv, sci, ntohl(hdr->packet_number));
 
 	sg_init_table(sg, ret);
-	skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
+	ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
+	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
 
 	if (hdr->tci_an & MACSEC_TCI_E) {
 		/* confidentiality: ethernet + macsec header