linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.9 152/310] ovl: filter trusted xattr for non-admin

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Message-Id: <20180411183628.971060285@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Wed, 11 Apr 2018 20:34:51 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>,
        Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 152/310] ovl: filter trusted xattr for non-admin

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>


[ Upstream commit a082c6f680da298cf075886ff032f32ccb7c5e1a ]

Filesystems filter out extended attributes in the "trusted." domain for
unprivlieged callers.

Overlay calls underlying filesystem's method with elevated privs, so need
to do the filtering in overlayfs too.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/overlayfs/inode.c |   12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
@@ -227,6 +227,16 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return res;
 }
 
+static bool ovl_can_list(const char *s)
+{
+	/* List all non-trusted xatts */
+	if (strncmp(s, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) != 0)
+		return true;
+
+	/* Never list trusted.overlay, list other trusted for superuser only */
+	return !ovl_is_private_xattr(s) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
 ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
 {
 	struct dentry *realdentry = ovl_dentry_real(dentry);
@@ -250,7 +260,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *den
 			return -EIO;
 
 		len -= slen;
-		if (ovl_is_private_xattr(s)) {
+		if (!ovl_can_list(s)) {
 			res -= slen;
 			memmove(s, s + slen, len);
 		} else {