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Message-Id: <20180411183622.833783366@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Wed, 11 Apr 2018 20:32:31 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
        Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>,
        Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 012/310] af_key: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in pfkey_compile_policy.

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>


[ Upstream commit d90c902449a7561f1b1d58ba5a0d11728ce8b0b2 ]

The sadb_x_sec_len is stored in the unit 'byte divided by eight'.
So we have to multiply this value by eight before we can do
size checks. Otherwise we may get a slab-out-of-bounds when
we memcpy the user sec_ctx.

Fixes: df71837d502 ("[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 net/key/af_key.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/key/af_key.c
+++ b/net/key/af_key.c
@@ -3305,7 +3305,7 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *pfkey_compile
 		p += pol->sadb_x_policy_len*8;
 		sec_ctx = (struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *)p;
 		if (len < pol->sadb_x_policy_len*8 +
-		    sec_ctx->sadb_x_sec_len) {
+		    sec_ctx->sadb_x_sec_len*8) {
 			*dir = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
 		}


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