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Message-Id: <20180411183602.645674183@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 20:36:58 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>,
syzbot <syzkaller@...glegroups.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 172/190] sctp: do not leak kernel memory to user space
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
[ Upstream commit 6780db244d6b1537d139dea0ec8aad10cf9e4adb ]
syzbot produced a nice report [1]
Issue here is that a recvmmsg() managed to leak 8 bytes of kernel memory
to user space, because sin_zero (padding field) was not properly cleared.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:227
CPU: 1 PID: 3586 Comm: syzkaller481044 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #82
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x164/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1176
kmsan_copy_to_user+0x69/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1199
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:227
___sys_recvmsg+0x4e2/0x810 net/socket.c:2211
__sys_recvmmsg+0x54e/0xdb0 net/socket.c:2313
SYSC_recvmmsg+0x29b/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2394
SyS_recvmmsg+0x76/0xa0 net/socket.c:2378
do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x4401c9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc56f73098 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 00000000004401c9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020003ac0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000020003bc0 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000401af0
R13: 0000000000401b80 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Local variable description: ----addr@...sys_recvmsg
Variable was created at:
___sys_recvmsg+0xd5/0x810 net/socket.c:2172
__sys_recvmmsg+0x54e/0xdb0 net/socket.c:2313
Bytes 8-15 of 16 are uninitialized
==================================================================
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 1 PID: 3586 Comm: syzkaller481044 Tainted: G B 4.16.0+ #82
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
panic+0x39d/0x940 kernel/panic.c:183
kmsan_report+0x238/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1083
kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x164/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1176
kmsan_copy_to_user+0x69/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1199
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:227
___sys_recvmsg+0x4e2/0x810 net/socket.c:2211
__sys_recvmmsg+0x54e/0xdb0 net/socket.c:2313
SYSC_recvmmsg+0x29b/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2394
SyS_recvmmsg+0x76/0xa0 net/socket.c:2378
do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@...glegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
net/sctp/ipv6.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -723,8 +723,10 @@ static int sctp_v6_addr_to_user(struct s
sctp_v6_map_v4(addr);
}
- if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+ if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
+ memset(addr->v4.sin_zero, 0, sizeof(addr->v4.sin_zero));
return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ }
return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
}
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