lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20180411183459.036191423@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Wed, 11 Apr 2018 20:35:46 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@...il.com>,
        Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>,
        Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.18 043/121] fix race in drivers/char/random.c:get_reg()

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@...il.com>


[ Upstream commit 9dfa7bba35ac08a63565d58c454dccb7e1bb0a08 ]

get_reg() can be reentered on architectures with prioritized interrupts
(m68k in this case), causing f->reg_index to be incremented after the
range check. Out of bounds memory access past the pt_regs struct results.
This will go mostly undetected unless access is beyond end of memory.

Prevent the race by disabling interrupts in get_reg().

Tested on m68k (Atari Falcon, and ARAnyM emulator).

Kudos to Geert Uytterhoeven for helping to trace this race.

Signed-off-by: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -863,12 +863,16 @@ static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t
 static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	__u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs;
+	unsigned long flags;
 
 	if (regs == NULL)
 		return 0;
+	local_irq_save(flags);
 	if (f->reg_idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32))
 		f->reg_idx = 0;
-	return *(ptr + f->reg_idx++);
+	ptr += f->reg_idx++;
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+	return *ptr;
 }
 
 void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)


Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ