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Message-Id: <1523533097.31852.11.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2018 07:38:17 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, linux-man@...r.kernel.org,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/24] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is
locked down
On Wed, 2018-04-11 at 16:09 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Wed, 2018-04-11 at 14:00 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> > David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> writes:
> >
> > > From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
> > >
> > > The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary
> > > code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It
> > > makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation.
> > >
> > > This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a
> > > signature on the image to be booted.
> >
> > Maybing I am missing it but I am not seeing anything that would require
> > kexec_file_load be configured such that it checks the loaded kernel.
> >
> > Without that I don't see the point of disabling kexec_load.
> >
> > Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
>
> The IMA "secure boot" policy requires the kexec image to be signed.
> This call to kernel_is_locked_down() could be replaced with a call
> to security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE).
>
> It would be similar to the existing init_module syscall calling
> security_kernel_read_file().
David, enabling the IMA-appraisal "secure boot" policy should probably
not be dependent on lockdown either.
Mimi
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