linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] x86/xen/efi: Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot

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Date:   Mon, 16 Apr 2018 10:15:15 +0200
From:   Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
To:     Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@...cle.com>
Cc:     James Bottomley <james.bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
        linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        xen-devel <xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        eric.snowberg@...cle.com, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/xen/efi: Initialize UEFI secure boot state during
 dom0 boot

On 11 April 2018 at 10:56, Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@...cle.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 12:38:24PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 10:00:52AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
>> > On Tue, 2018-04-03 at 18:07 +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
>> > > On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 08:44:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
>>
>> [...]
>>
>> > > > This looks like a bad idea: you're duplicating the secure boot
>> > > > check in
>> > > >
>> > > > drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
>> > > >
>> > > > Which is an implementation of policy.  If we have to have policy in
>> > > > the kernel, it should really only be in one place to prevent drift;
>> > > > why can't you simply use the libstub efi_get_secureboot() so we're
>> > > > not duplicating the implementation of policy?
>> > >
>> > > Well, here is the first version of this patch:
>> > > https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/9/496 Ard did not like it. I was not
>> > > happy too. In general both approaches are not perfect. More you can
>> > > find in the discussion around this patchset. If you have better idea
>> > > how to do that I am happy to implement it.
>> >
>> > One way might be simply to have the pre exit-boot-services code lay
>> > down a variable containing the state which you pick up, rather than you
>>
>> Do you mean variable in kernel proper or something like that? If yes this
>> is not possible. EFI Linux stub is not executed in Xen dom0. All UEFI
>> infrastructure is owned and operated by Xen. Dom0 kernel can access some
>> stuff in UEFI, including variables, via hypercall. However, when dom0
>> runs only UEFI runtime services are available.
>>
>> > calling efi code separately and trying to use the insecure RT
>>
>> I am not sure why they are insecure.
>>
>> > variables.  That way there's a uniform view of the internal kernel
>> > secure boot state that everyone can use.
>>
>> That would be perfect but I have a feeling that in form proposed above
>> it is not possible.
>
> Ping?
>

(apologies if this is a duplicate email - I thought I had replied
already but I don't see it in my sent folder)

Queued in efi/next - thanks.