linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH ghak32 V2 10/13] audit: add containerid support for seccomp and anom

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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhS+QgCqdSvZuBY_wTqGK245BY8txFUugy=bx9K5aSroCQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 20 Apr 2018 12:11:09 -0400
From:   Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To:     Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Cc:     simo@...hat.com, jlayton@...hat.com, carlos@...hat.com,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, dhowells@...hat.com,
        Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
        ebiederm@...ssion.com, luto@...nel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
        serge@...lyn.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH ghak32 V2 10/13] audit: add containerid support for
 seccomp and anom_abend records

On Thu, Apr 19, 2018 at 8:42 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 2018-04-18 21:31, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:00 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
>> > Add container ID auxiliary records to secure computing and abnormal end
>> > standalone records.
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
>> > ---
>> >  kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++++++--
>> >  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
>> > index 7103d23..2f02ed9 100644
>> > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
>> > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
>> > @@ -2571,6 +2571,7 @@ static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>> >  void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
>> >  {
>> >         struct audit_buffer *ab;
>> > +       struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local();
>>
>> Looking quickly at do_coredump() I *believe* we can use current here.
>>
>> >         if (!audit_enabled)
>> >                 return;
>> > @@ -2578,19 +2579,22 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
>> >         if (signr == SIGQUIT)   /* don't care for those */
>> >                 return;
>> >
>> > -       ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
>> > +       ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
>> >         if (unlikely(!ab))
>> >                 return;
>> >         audit_log_task(ab);
>> >         audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
>> >         audit_log_end(ab);
>> > +       audit_log_container_info(context, "abend", audit_get_containerid(current));
>> > +       audit_free_context(context);
>> >  }
>> >
>> >  void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
>> >  {
>> >         struct audit_buffer *ab;
>> > +       struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local();
>>
>> We can definitely use current here.
>
> Ok, so both syscall aux records.  That elimintes this patch from the
> set, can go in independently.

Yep.  It should help shrink the audit container ID patchset and
perhaps more importantly it should put some distance between the
connected-record debate and the audit container ID debate.

I understand we are going to need a "local" context for some things,
the network packets are probably the best example, but whenever
possible I would like to connect these records back to a task's
context.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com