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Message-ID: <001101d3dca7$e9cc3600$bd64a200$@foss.arm.com>
Date:   Wed, 25 Apr 2018 18:13:01 +0300
From:   <yael.chemla@...s.arm.com>
To:     "'Eric Biggers'" <ebiggers3@...il.com>
Cc:     "'Alasdair Kergon'" <agk@...hat.com>,
        "'Mike Snitzer'" <snitzer@...hat.com>, <dm-devel@...hat.com>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <ofir.drang@...il.com>,
        "'Yael Chemla'" <yael.chemla@....com>,
        <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, <gilad@...yossef.com>
Subject: RE: [dm-devel] [PATCH 2/2] md: dm-verity: allow parallel processing of bio blocks



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>
> Sent: Tuesday, 27 March 2018 9:55
> To: Yael Chemla <yael.chemla@...s.arm.com>
> Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@...hat.com>; Mike Snitzer <snitzer@...hat.com>;
> dm-devel@...hat.com; linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org; ofir.drang@...il.com;
> Yael Chemla <yael.chemla@....com>; linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org;
> gilad@...yossef.com
> Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH 2/2] md: dm-verity: allow parallel processing
> of bio blocks
> 
> [+Cc linux-crypto]
> 
> Hi Yael,
> 
> On Sun, Mar 25, 2018 at 07:41:30PM +0100, Yael Chemla wrote:
> >  Allow parallel processing of bio blocks by moving to async.
> > completion  handling. This allows for better resource utilization of
> > both HW and  software based hash tfm and therefore better performance
> > in many cases,  depending on the specific tfm in use.
> >
> >  Tested on ARM32 (zynq board) and ARM64 (Juno board).
> >  Time of cat command was measured on a filesystem with various file sizes.
> >  12% performance improvement when HW based hash was used (ccree
> driver).
> >  SW based hash showed less than 1% improvement.
> >  CPU utilization when HW based hash was used presented 10% less
> > context  switch, 4% less cycles and 7% less instructions. No
> > difference in  CPU utilization noticed with SW based hash.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Yael Chemla <yael.chemla@...s.arm.com>
> 
> Okay, I definitely would like to see dm-verity better support hardware crypto
> accelerators, but these patches were painful to read.
> 
> There are lots of smaller bugs, but the high-level problem which you need to
> address first is that on every bio you are always allocating all the extra
> memory to hold a hash request and scatterlist for every data block.  This will

I have a question regarding scatterlist memory:
I noticed that all blocks in dmverity end up using two buffers: one for data and other for salt. 
I'm using function similar to verity_for_io_block to iterate and find the number of buffers,
in my case data_dev_block_bits =12, todo=4096, thus the do while will iterate only once.
I assume that since it's there there are cases it'll iterate more.
I'm trying to figure out which cases will require more than one buffer of data per block? 
In dm_crypt there is limitation of static 4 scatterlist elements per in/out (see struct dm_crypt_request).
Is there an upper bound regarding number of buffers per block in dm-verity?  
I need this for the implementation of  mempool per scatterlist buffers.
Thanks ,
Yael

> not only hurt performance when the hashing is done in software (I'm
> skeptical that your performance numbers are representative of that case), but
> it will also fall apart under memory pressure.  We are trying to get low-end
> Android devices to start using dm-verity, and such devices often have only 1
> GB or even only 512 MB of RAM, so memory allocations are at increased risk
> of failing.  In fact I'm pretty sure you didn't do any proper stress testing of
> these patches, since the first thing they do for every bio is try to allocate a
> physically contiguous array that is nearly as long as the full bio data itself
> (n_blocks * sizeof(struct dm_verity_req_data) = n_blocks * 3264, at least on a
> 64-bit platform, mostly due to the 'struct dm_verity_fec_io'), so potentially
> up to about 1 MB; that's going to fail a lot even on systems with gigabytes of
> RAM...
> 
> (You also need to verify that your new code is compatible with the forward
> error correction feature, with the "ignore_zero_blocks" option, and with the
> new "check_at_most_once" option.  From my reading of the code, all of
> those seemed broken; the dm_verity_fec_io structures, for example, weren't
> even being
> initialized...)
> 
> I think you need to take a close look at how dm-crypt handles async crypto
> implementations, since it seems to do it properly without hurting the
> common case where the crypto happens synchronously.  What it does, is it
> reserves space in the per-bio data for a single cipher request.  Then, *only* if
> the cipher implementation actually processes the request asynchronously (as
> indicated by -EINPROGRESS being returned) is a new cipher request allocated
> dynamically, using a mempool (not kmalloc, which is prone to fail).  Note that
> unlike your patches it also properly handles the case where the hardware
> crypto queue is full, as indicated by the cipher implementation returning -
> EBUSY; in that case, dm-crypt waits to start another request until there is
> space in the queue.
> 
> I think it would be possible to adapt dm-crypt's solution to dm-verity.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Eric
> 
> > ---
> >  drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.c    |  10 +-
> >  drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.h    |   7 +-
> >  drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> ---------
> >  drivers/md/dm-verity.h        |   4 +-
> >  4 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.c
> > index e13f908..bcea307 100644
> > --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.c
> > +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.c
> > @@ -203,13 +203,12 @@ static int fec_is_erasure(struct dm_verity *v,
> struct dm_verity_io *io,
> >   */
> >  static int fec_read_bufs(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
> >  			 u64 rsb, u64 target, unsigned block_offset,
> > -			 int *neras)
> > +			 int *neras, struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio)
> >  {
> >  	bool is_zero;
> >  	int i, j, target_index = -1;
> >  	struct dm_buffer *buf;
> >  	struct dm_bufio_client *bufio;
> > -	struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio = fec_io(io);
> >  	u64 block, ileaved;
> >  	u8 *bbuf, *rs_block;
> >  	u8 want_digest[v->digest_size];
> > @@ -265,7 +264,7 @@ static int fec_read_bufs(struct dm_verity *v,
> > struct dm_verity_io *io,
> >
> >  		/* locate erasures if the block is on the data device */
> >  		if (bufio == v->fec->data_bufio &&
> > -		    verity_hash_for_block(v, io, block, want_digest,
> > +		    verity_hash_for_block(v, io, block, want_digest, fio,
> >  					  &is_zero) == 0) {
> >  			/* skip known zero blocks entirely */
> >  			if (is_zero)
> > @@ -374,7 +373,7 @@ static int fec_decode_rsb(struct dm_verity *v, struct
> dm_verity_io *io,
> >  		fec_init_bufs(v, fio);
> >
> >  		r = fec_read_bufs(v, io, rsb, offset, pos,
> > -				  use_erasures ? &neras : NULL);
> > +				  use_erasures ? &neras : NULL, fio);
> >  		if (unlikely(r < 0))
> >  			return r;
> >
> > @@ -419,10 +418,9 @@ static int fec_bv_copy(struct dm_verity *v, struct
> dm_verity_io *io, u8 *data,
> >   */
> >  int verity_fec_decode(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
> >  		      enum verity_block_type type, sector_t block, u8 *dest,
> > -		      struct bvec_iter *iter)
> > +		      struct bvec_iter *iter, struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio)
> >  {
> >  	int r;
> > -	struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio = fec_io(io);
> >  	u64 offset, res, rsb;
> >
> >  	if (!verity_fec_is_enabled(v))
> > diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.h b/drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.h
> > index bb31ce8..46c2f47 100644
> > --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.h
> > +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.h
> > @@ -73,7 +73,9 @@ extern bool verity_fec_is_enabled(struct dm_verity
> > *v);
> >
> >  extern int verity_fec_decode(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
> >  			     enum verity_block_type type, sector_t block,
> > -			     u8 *dest, struct bvec_iter *iter);
> > +			     u8 *dest, struct bvec_iter *iter,
> > +			     struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio);
> > +
> >
> >  extern unsigned verity_fec_status_table(struct dm_verity *v, unsigned sz,
> >  					char *result, unsigned maxlen);
> > @@ -104,7 +106,8 @@ static inline int verity_fec_decode(struct dm_verity
> *v,
> >  				    struct dm_verity_io *io,
> >  				    enum verity_block_type type,
> >  				    sector_t block, u8 *dest,
> > -				    struct bvec_iter *iter)
> > +				    struct bvec_iter *iter,
> > +				    struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio)
> >  {
> >  	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >  }
> > diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
> > b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c index a281b83..30512ee 100644
> > --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
> > +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
> > @@ -38,7 +38,35 @@
> >  /* only two elements in static scatter list: salt and data */
> >  #define SG_FIXED_ITEMS	2
> >
> > +struct dm_ver_io_data {
> > +	atomic_t expected_reqs;
> > +	atomic_t err;
> > +	int total_reqs;
> > +	struct dm_ver_req_data *reqdata_arr;
> > +	struct dm_verity_io *io;
> > +};
> > +
> > +#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 /* as big as sha512 digest size */
> > +
> > +struct dm_ver_req_data {
> > +	u8 want_digest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> > +	u8 real_digest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> > +	struct dm_verity_fec_io fec_io;
> > +	unsigned int iblock;	// block index in the request
> > +	unsigned int digest_size;
> > +	struct scatterlist *sg;
> > +	struct dm_ver_io_data *iodata;
> > +	/* req field is the last on purpose since it's not fixed in size and
> > +	 *  its size if calucluated using ahash_request_alloc or an addition of
> > +	 *  the required size is done with +crypto_ahash_reqsize(v->tfm)
> > +	 */
> > +	struct ahash_request *req;
> > +};
> > +
> >  static unsigned dm_verity_prefetch_cluster =
> > DM_VERITY_DEFAULT_PREFETCH_SIZE;
> > +static void verity_finish_io(struct dm_verity_io *io, blk_status_t
> > +status); static void verity_release_req(struct dm_ver_io_data
> > +*iodata);
> > +
> >
> >  module_param_named(prefetch_cluster, dm_verity_prefetch_cluster,
> > uint, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
> >
> > @@ -102,7 +130,7 @@ static sector_t verity_position_at_level(struct
> > dm_verity *v, sector_t block,
> >
> >  /*
> >   * verity_is_salt_required - check if according to verity version and
> > - * verity salt's size if there's a need to insert a salt.
> > + * verity salt's size there's a need to insert a salt.
> >   * note: salt goes last for 0th version and first for all others
> >   * @where - START_SG - before buffer / END_SG - after buffer
> >   */
> > @@ -247,7 +275,7 @@ static int verity_handle_err(struct dm_verity *v,
> enum verity_block_type type,
> >   */
> >  static int verity_verify_level(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
> >  			       sector_t block, int level, bool skip_unverified,
> > -			       u8 *want_digest)
> > +			       u8 *want_digest, struct dm_verity_fec_io *fec_io)
> >  {
> >  	struct dm_buffer *buf;
> >  	struct buffer_aux *aux;
> > @@ -281,7 +309,7 @@ static int verity_verify_level(struct dm_verity *v,
> struct dm_verity_io *io,
> >  			aux->hash_verified = 1;
> >  		else if (verity_fec_decode(v, io,
> >
> DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_METADATA,
> > -					   hash_block, data, NULL) == 0)
> > +					   hash_block, data, NULL, fec_io) == 0)
> >  			aux->hash_verified = 1;
> >  		else if (verity_handle_err(v,
> >
> DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_METADATA, @@ -305,7 +333,9 @@ static int
> > verity_verify_level(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
> >   * of the hash tree if necessary.
> >   */
> >  int verity_hash_for_block(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
> > -			  sector_t block, u8 *digest, bool *is_zero)
> > +			  sector_t block, u8 *digest,
> > +			  struct dm_verity_fec_io *fec_io,
> > +			  bool *is_zero)
> >  {
> >  	int r = 0, i;
> >
> > @@ -317,7 +347,7 @@ int verity_hash_for_block(struct dm_verity *v, struct
> dm_verity_io *io,
> >  		 * function returns 1 and we fall back to whole
> >  		 * chain verification.
> >  		 */
> > -		r = verity_verify_level(v, io, block, 0, true, digest);
> > +		r = verity_verify_level(v, io, block, 0, true, digest, fec_io);
> >  		if (likely(r <= 0))
> >  			goto out;
> >  	}
> > @@ -325,7 +355,7 @@ int verity_hash_for_block(struct dm_verity *v, struct
> dm_verity_io *io,
> >  	memcpy(digest, v->root_digest, v->digest_size);
> >
> >  	for (i = v->levels - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
> > -		r = verity_verify_level(v, io, block, i, false, digest);
> > +		r = verity_verify_level(v, io, block, i, false, digest, fec_io);
> >  		if (unlikely(r))
> >  			goto out;
> >  	}
> > @@ -436,39 +466,118 @@ static int verity_bv_zero(struct dm_verity *v,
> struct dm_verity_io *io,
> >  	return 0;
> >  }
> >
> > +
> > +static void verity_cb_complete(struct dm_ver_io_data *iodata, int
> > +err) {
> > +	struct dm_verity_io *io = iodata->io;
> > +
> > +	/* save last error occurred */
> > +	if (err)
> > +		atomic_set(&iodata->err, err);
> > +	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&iodata->expected_reqs)) {
> > +		verity_release_req(iodata);
> > +		verity_finish_io(io, errno_to_blk_status(err));
> > +	}
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void __single_block_req_done(struct dm_ver_req_data *req_data,
> > +					int err, struct dm_verity_io *io) {
> > +	struct dm_verity *v = io->v;
> > +
> > +	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	WARN_ON((err != 0) || (req_data == NULL) || (req_data->iodata ==
> NULL));
> > +	if ((err != 0) || (req_data == NULL) || (req_data->iodata == NULL))
> > +		goto complete;
> > +
> > +	kfree(req_data->sg);
> > +
> > +	if (likely(memcmp(req_data->real_digest,
> > +			req_data->want_digest, req_data->digest_size) == 0))
> > +		goto complete;
> > +	else if (verity_fec_decode(v, io, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_DATA,
> > +			io->block + req_data->iblock, NULL, &io->iter,
> > +			&req_data->fec_io) == 0){
> > +		goto complete;
> > +	} else if (verity_handle_err(v, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_DATA,
> > +		req_data->iodata->io->block + req_data->iblock)){
> > +		err = -EIO;
> > +		goto complete;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +complete:
> > +	ahash_request_free(req_data->req);
> > +	verity_cb_complete(req_data->iodata, err); }
> > +
> > +static void single_block_req_done(struct crypto_async_request *req,
> > +int err) {
> > +	struct dm_ver_req_data *req_data = req->data;
> > +
> > +	__single_block_req_done(req_data, err, req_data->iodata->io); }
> > +
> > +static void verity_release_req(struct dm_ver_io_data *iodata) {
> > +	kfree(iodata->reqdata_arr);
> > +	kfree(iodata);
> > +}
> >  /*
> >   * Verify one "dm_verity_io" structure.
> >   */
> > -static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
> > +static void verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
> >  {
> >  	bool is_zero;
> >  	struct dm_verity *v = io->v;
> > -	struct bvec_iter start;
> > -	unsigned b;
> > -	struct crypto_wait wait;
> > -	struct scatterlist *sg;
> > -	int r;
> > +	unsigned int b = 0, blocks = 0;
> > +	struct dm_ver_io_data *iodata = NULL;
> > +	struct dm_ver_req_data *reqdata_arr = NULL;
> > +	struct scatterlist *sg = NULL;
> > +	int res;
> > +
> > +	iodata = kmalloc(sizeof(*iodata), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	reqdata_arr = kmalloc_array(io->n_blocks,
> > +			sizeof(struct dm_ver_req_data), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (unlikely((iodata == NULL) || (reqdata_arr == NULL))) {
> > +		WARN_ON((iodata == NULL) || (reqdata_arr == NULL));
> > +		goto err_memfree;
> > +	}
> > +	atomic_set(&iodata->expected_reqs, io->n_blocks);
> > +	iodata->reqdata_arr = reqdata_arr;
> > +	iodata->io = io;
> > +	iodata->total_reqs = blocks = io->n_blocks;
> > +
> >
> > -	for (b = 0; b < io->n_blocks; b++) {
> > +	for (b = 0; b < blocks; b++) {
> >  		unsigned int nents;
> >  		unsigned int total_len = 0;
> >  		unsigned int num_of_buffs = 0;
> > -		struct ahash_request *req = verity_io_hash_req(v, io);
> >
> > -		/* an extra one for the salt buffer */
> > +		reqdata_arr[b].req = ahash_request_alloc(v->tfm,
> GFP_KERNEL);
> > +
> > +		if (unlikely(reqdata_arr[b].req == NULL))
> > +			goto err_memfree;
> > +		/* +1 for the salt buffer */
> > +		ahash_request_set_tfm(reqdata_arr[b].req, v->tfm);
> >  		num_of_buffs = verity_calc_buffs_for_bv(v, io, io->iter) + 1;
> >  		WARN_ON(num_of_buffs < 1);
> >
> >  		sg = kmalloc_array(num_of_buffs, sizeof(struct scatterlist),
> >  				     GFP_KERNEL);
> > -		if (!sg)
> > -			return -ENOMEM;
> > +		if (!sg) {
> > +			DMERR("%s kmalloc_array failed", __func__);
> > +			goto err_memfree;
> > +		}
> > +
> >  		sg_init_table(sg, num_of_buffs);
> >
> > -		r = verity_hash_for_block(v, io, io->block + b,
> > -					  verity_io_want_digest(v, io),
> > -					  &is_zero);
> > -		if (unlikely(r < 0))
> > +		res = verity_hash_for_block(v, io, io->block + b,
> > +					    reqdata_arr[b].want_digest,
> > +					    &reqdata_arr[b].fec_io,
> > +					    &is_zero);
> > +		if (unlikely(res < 0))
> >  			goto err_memfree;
> >
> >  		if (is_zero) {
> > @@ -476,56 +585,54 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
> >  			 * If we expect a zero block, don't validate, just
> >  			 * return zeros.
> >  			 */
> > -			r = verity_for_bv_block(v, io, &io->iter,
> > +			res = verity_for_bv_block(v, io, &io->iter,
> >  						verity_bv_zero);
> > -			if (unlikely(r < 0))
> > +			if (unlikely(res < 0))
> >  				goto err_memfree;
> > -
> > +			verity_cb_complete(reqdata_arr[b].iodata, res);
> >  			continue;
> >  		}
> >
> > -		ahash_request_set_tfm(req, v->tfm);
> > -		ahash_request_set_callback(req,
> CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
> > -					CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
> > -					crypto_req_done, (void *)&wait);
> >  		nents = 0;
> >  		total_len = 0;
> >  		if (verity_is_salt_required(v, START_SG))
> >  			verity_add_salt(v, sg, &nents, &total_len);
> >
> > -		start = io->iter;
> > -		verity_for_io_block(v, io, &io->iter, sg, &nents, &total_len);
> > +		verity_for_io_block(v, io, &io->iter, sg, &nents,
> > +				&total_len);
> >  		if (verity_is_salt_required(v, END_SG))
> >  			verity_add_salt(v, sg, &nents, &total_len);
> > -		/*
> > -		 * need to mark end of chain, since we might have allocated
> > -		 * more than we actually use
> > +		reqdata_arr[b].iodata = iodata;
> > +		reqdata_arr[b].sg = sg;
> > +		reqdata_arr[b].digest_size = v->digest_size;
> > +		reqdata_arr[b].iblock = b;
> > +		/* need to mark end of chain,
> > +		 * since we might have allocated more than we actually use
> >  		 */
> >  		sg_mark_end(&sg[nents-1]);
> > -		ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, verity_io_real_digest(v, io),
> > -				total_len);
> > -		crypto_init_wait(&wait);
> > -		r = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_digest(req), &wait);
> >
> > -		if (unlikely(r < 0))
> > -			goto err_memfree;
> > -		kfree(sg);
> > -		if (likely(memcmp(verity_io_real_digest(v, io),
> > -				  verity_io_want_digest(v, io), v->digest_size)
> == 0))
> > -			continue;
> > -		else if (verity_fec_decode(v, io,
> DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_DATA,
> > -					   io->block + b, NULL, &start) == 0)
> > -			continue;
> > -		else if (verity_handle_err(v, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_DATA,
> > -					   io->block + b))
> > -			return -EIO;
> > -	}
> > +		ahash_request_set_tfm(reqdata_arr[b].req, v->tfm);
> > +		ahash_request_set_callback(reqdata_arr[b].req,
> > +			CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
> CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
> > +			single_block_req_done, (void *)&reqdata_arr[b]);
> >
> > -	return 0;
> > +		ahash_request_set_crypt(reqdata_arr[b].req, sg,
> > +			reqdata_arr[b].real_digest, total_len);
> > +		res = crypto_ahash_digest(reqdata_arr[b].req);
> > +		/* digest completed already, callback won't be called. */
> > +		if (res == 0)
> > +			__single_block_req_done(&reqdata_arr[b], res, io);
> > +
> > +	}
> > +	return;
> >
> >  err_memfree:
> > -	kfree(sg);
> > -	return r;
> > +	DMERR("%s: error occurred", __func__);
> > +	/* reduce expected requests by the number of
> > +	 * unsent requests, -1 accounting for the current block
> > +	 */
> > +	atomic_sub(blocks-b-1, &iodata->expected_reqs);
> > +	verity_cb_complete(iodata, -EIO);
> >  }
> >
> >  /*
> > @@ -548,7 +655,7 @@ static void verity_work(struct work_struct *w)  {
> >  	struct dm_verity_io *io = container_of(w, struct dm_verity_io,
> > work);
> >
> > -	verity_finish_io(io, errno_to_blk_status(verity_verify_io(io)));
> > +	verity_verify_io(io);
> >  }
> >
> >  static void verity_end_io(struct bio *bio) diff --git
> > a/drivers/md/dm-verity.h b/drivers/md/dm-verity.h index
> > b675bc0..0e407f6 100644
> > --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity.h
> > +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity.h
> > @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ enum verity_block_type {  };
> >
> >  struct dm_verity_fec;
> > +struct dm_verity_fec_io;
> >
> >  struct dm_verity {
> >  	struct dm_dev *data_dev;
> > @@ -124,6 +125,7 @@ extern int verity_hash(struct dm_verity *v, struct
> ahash_request *req,
> >  		       const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 *digest);
> >
> >  extern int verity_hash_for_block(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io
> *io,
> > -				 sector_t block, u8 *digest, bool *is_zero);
> > +				 sector_t block, u8 *digest,
> > +				 struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio, bool *is_zero);
> >
> >  #endif /* DM_VERITY_H */
> > --
> > 2.7.4
> >
> > --
> > dm-devel mailing list
> > dm-devel@...hat.com
> > https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

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