linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.16 068/113] ANDROID: binder: prevent transactions into own process.

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Message-Id: <20180430184018.103018616@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon, 30 Apr 2018 12:24:39 -0700
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        syzbot+09e05aba06723a94d43d@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
        Martijn Coenen <maco@...roid.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.16 068/113] ANDROID: binder: prevent transactions into own process.

4.16-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Martijn Coenen <maco@...roid.com>

commit 7aa135fcf26377f92dc0680a57566b4c7f3e281b upstream.

This can't happen with normal nodes (because you can't get a ref
to a node you own), but it could happen with the context manager;
to make the behavior consistent with regular nodes, reject
transactions into the context manager by the process owning it.

Reported-by: syzbot+09e05aba06723a94d43d@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@...roid.com>
Cc: stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/android/binder.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2839,6 +2839,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct bi
 			else
 				return_error = BR_DEAD_REPLY;
 			mutex_unlock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock);
+			if (target_node && target_proc == proc) {
+				binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction to context manager from process owning it\n",
+						  proc->pid, thread->pid);
+				return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
+				return_error_param = -EINVAL;
+				return_error_line = __LINE__;
+				goto err_invalid_target_handle;
+			}
 		}
 		if (!target_node) {
 			/*