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Message-Id: <1525182503-13849-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 1 May 2018 09:48:17 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@...hat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 0/6] firmware: kernel signature verification
Allow LSMs and IMA to differentiate between different methods of
firmware loading (eg. direct loading, sysfs fallback) and to
differentiate/coordinate between signature verification methods (eg.
regdb, IMA-appraisal).
In addition, the last two patches address the pre-allocated buffer. The
first of these patches doesn't differentiate between reading the
firmware first into kernel memory and verifying the kernel signature,
versus reading the firmware directly into a pre-allocated buffer.
The last patch, which is posted as an RFC, questions whether the device
can access the pre-allocated buffer before the kernel signature has been
verified.
Mimi Zohar (6):
firmware: permit LSMs and IMA to fail firmware sysfs fallback loading
ima: prevent sysfs fallback firmware loading
firmware: differentiate between signed regulatory.db and other
firmware
ima: coordinate with signed regulatory.db
ima: verify kernel firmware signatures when using a preallocated
buffer
ima: prevent loading firmware into a pre-allocated buffer
drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c | 7 +++++++
drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 5 +++++
include/linux/fs.h | 2 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--
2.7.5
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