linux-kernel - [PATCH v2 2/4] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG

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Message-Id: <1525301426-23543-3-git-send-email-me@tobin.cc>
Date:   Thu,  3 May 2018 08:50:24 +1000
From:   "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@...utronix.de>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/4] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG

Currently the function get_random_bytes_arch() has return value 'void'.
If the hw RNG fails we currently fall back to using get_random_bytes().
This defeats the purpose of requesting random material from the hw RNG
in the first place.

There are currently no intree users of get_random_bytes_arch().

Only get random bytes from the hw RNG, make function return the number
of bytes retrieved from the hw RNG.

Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc>
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
---
 drivers/char/random.c  | 16 +++++++++-------
 include/linux/random.h |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 031d18b31e0f..4b0ec597e783 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1725,26 +1725,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
  * key known by the NSA).  So it's useful if we need the speed, but
  * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
  * have put in a back door.
+ *
+ * Return number of bytes filled in.
  */
-void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
+int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
 	char *p = buf;
+	int left = nbytes;
 
-	trace_get_random_bytes_arch(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
-	while (nbytes) {
+	trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_);
+	while (left) {
 		unsigned long v;
-		int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long));
+		int chunk = min_t(int, left, (int)sizeof(unsigned long));
 
 		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
 			break;
 
 		memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
 		p += chunk;
-		nbytes -= chunk;
+		left -= chunk;
 	}
 
-	if (nbytes)
-		get_random_bytes(p, nbytes);
+	return nbytes - left;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 2ddf13b4281e..f1c9bc5cd231 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
 extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
 extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
+extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
 
 #ifndef MODULE
 extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
-- 
2.7.4