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Message-ID: <CAMuHMdWxU=gtLTDY-W0YCMD6eE4gSnjhFo5CRTqwq_Q=yH-zZA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 18:18:13 +0200
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Developers List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
stable <stable@...nel.org>,
Linux-Renesas <linux-renesas-soc@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/5] random: fix crng_ready() test
Hi Ted,
On Fri, Apr 13, 2018 at 3:30 AM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu> wrote:
> The crng_init variable has three states:
>
> 0: The CRNG is not initialized at all
> 1: The CRNG has a small amount of entropy, hopefully good enough for
> early-boot, non-cryptographical use cases
> 2: The CRNG is fully initialized and we are sure it is safe for
> cryptographic use cases.
>
> The crng_ready() function should only return true once we are in the
> last state.
>
> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
> Fixes: e192be9d9a30 ("random: replace non-blocking pool...")
> Cc: stable@...nel.org # 4.8+
> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Since commit 43838a23a05fbd13 ("random: fix crng_ready() test"),
all (few) remaining users of %p are printing too early, leading to "(ptrval)"
strings instead of actual hashed pointer values.
Sample timings on two platforms (arm / arm64) booting with lots of
debug ingo:
[ 28.521158] random: crng init done
[ 17.792705] random: crng init done
Gr{oetje,eeting}s,
Geert
--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- geert@...ux-m68k.org
In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But
when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds
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