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Message-ID: <20180503050902.GM3791@eros>
Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 15:09:02 +1000
From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@...utronix.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_early_boot
On Wed, May 02, 2018 at 09:57:57PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc> wrote:
> > Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires either a hw RNG or enough
> > entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence these conditions
> > may not be met resulting in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being
> > printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We
> > can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during
> > debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production
> > kernel behaviour the same.
> >
> > If new command line option debug_early_boot is enabled use
> > cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc>
> > ---
> > Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 ++++++++
> > lib/vsprintf.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> > 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > index b8d1379aa039..ab619c4ccbf2 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > @@ -748,6 +748,14 @@
> >
> > debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).
> >
> > + debug_early_boot
> > + [KNL] Enable debugging early in the boot sequence. If
> > + enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash
> > + pointers. Use this option if you need to see pointer
> > + values during early boot (i.e you are seeing instances
> > + of '(___ptrval___)') - cryptographically insecure,
> > + please do not use on production kernels.
> > +
> > debug_locks_verbose=
> > [KNL] verbose self-tests
> > Format=<0|1>
> > diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> > index 3697a19c2b25..6c139b442267 100644
> > --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> > +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> > @@ -1654,6 +1654,18 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
> > return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
> > }
> >
> > +/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */
> > +static int debug_early_boot;
>
> Please make this __ro_after_init too.
Good suggestion. I forgot, we are supposed to be closing security
wholes not opening them :)
thanks,
Tobin.
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