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Message-Id: <20180503132031.25705-4-mark.rutland@arm.com>
Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 14:20:24 +0100
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu,
catalin.marinas@....com, christoffer.dall@....com,
drjones@...hat.com, marc.zyngier@....com, mark.rutland@....com,
ramana.radhakrishnan@....com, suzuki.poulose@....com,
will.deacon@....com, awallis@...eaurora.org
Subject: [PATCHv4 03/10] arm64/kvm: hide ptrauth from guests
In subsequent patches we're going to expose ptrauth to the host kernel
and userspace, but things are a bit trickier for guest kernels. For the
time being, let's hide ptrauth from KVM guests.
Regardless of how well-behaved the guest kernel is, guest userspace
could attempt to use ptrauth instructions, triggering a trap to EL2,
resulting in noise from kvm_handle_unknown_ec(). So let's write up a
handler for the PAC trap, which silently injects an UNDEF into the
guest, as if the feature were really missing.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@...hat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@....com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>
Cc: kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu
---
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 8 ++++++++
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
index e5e741bfffe1..5114ad691eae 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
@@ -173,6 +173,23 @@ static int handle_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
return 1;
}
+/*
+ * Guest usage of a ptrauth instruction (which the guest EL1 did not turn into
+ * a NOP), or guest EL1 access to a ptrauth register.
+ */
+static int kvm_handle_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
+{
+ /*
+ * We don't currently suport ptrauth in a guest, and we mask the ID
+ * registers to prevent well-behaved guests from trying to make use of
+ * it.
+ *
+ * Inject an UNDEF, as if the feature really isn't present.
+ */
+ kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
+ return 1;
+}
+
static exit_handle_fn arm_exit_handlers[] = {
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = kvm_handle_unknown_ec,
[ESR_ELx_EC_WFx] = kvm_handle_wfx,
@@ -195,6 +212,7 @@ static exit_handle_fn arm_exit_handlers[] = {
[ESR_ELx_EC_BKPT32] = kvm_handle_guest_debug,
[ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64] = kvm_handle_guest_debug,
[ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD] = handle_no_fpsimd,
+ [ESR_ELx_EC_PAC] = kvm_handle_ptrauth,
};
static exit_handle_fn kvm_get_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
index 806b0b126a64..8b0dfc00bf5e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
@@ -1000,6 +1000,14 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(struct sys_reg_desc const *r, bool raz)
task_pid_nr(current));
val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT);
+ } else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1) {
+ const u64 ptrauth_mask = (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT) |
+ (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |
+ (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) |
+ (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT);
+ if (val & ptrauth_mask)
+ kvm_debug("ptrauth unsupported for guests, suppressing\n");
+ val &= ~ptrauth_mask;
} else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1) {
if (val & (0xfUL << ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT))
pr_err_once("kvm [%i]: LORegions unsupported for guests, suppressing\n",
--
2.11.0
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