linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack

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Message-ID: <20180511161317.57k6prl54xjmsit3@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com>
Date:   Fri, 11 May 2018 17:13:18 +0100
From:   Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To:     Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack

On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 06:50:09PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
> Hello everyone,
> 
> On 06.05.2018 11:22, Alexander Popov wrote:
> > On 04.05.2018 14:09, Mark Rutland wrote:
> >>>>> +	stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
> >>>>> +	BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256);
> >>>>
> >>>> Is this arbitrary, or is there something special about 256?
> >>>>
> >>>> Even if this is arbitrary, can we give it some mnemonic?
> >>>
> >>> It's just a reasonable number. We can introduce a macro for it.
> >>
> >> I'm just not sure I see the point in the offset, given things like
> >> VMAP_STACK exist. BUG_ON() handling will likely require *more* than 256
> >> bytes of stack, so it seems superfluous, as we'd be relying on stack
> >> overflow detection at that point.
> >>
> >> I can see that we should take the CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK offset
> >> into account, though.
> > 
> > Mark, thank you for such an important remark!
> > 
> > In Kconfig STACKLEAK implies but doesn't depend on VMAP_STACK. In fact x86_32
> > doesn't have VMAP_STACK at all but can have STACKLEAK.
> > 
> > [Adding Andy Lutomirski]
> > 
> > I've made some additional experiments: I exhaust the thread stack to have only
> > (MIN_STACK_LEFT - 1) bytes left and then force alloca. If VMAP_STACK is
> > disabled, BUG_ON() handling causes stack depth overflow, which is detected by
> > SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK. If VMAP_STACK is enabled, the kernel hangs on BUG_ON()
> > handling! Enabling CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING gives the needed report from VMAP_STACK:

I can't see why CONFIG_VMAP_STACK would only work in conjunction with
CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING.

On arm64 at least, if we overflow the stack while handling a BUG(), we
*should* trigger the overflow handler as usual, and that should work,
unless I'm missing something.

Maybe it gets part-way into panic(), sets up some state,
stack-overflows, and we get wedged because we're already in a panic?
Perhaps CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING causes more stack to be used, so it dies a
little earlier in panic(), before setting up some state that causes
wedging.

... which sounds like something best fixed in those code paths, and not
here.

> [...]
> 
> > I can't say why VMAP_STACK report hangs during BUG_ON() handling on defconfig.
> > Andy, can you give a clue?
> > 
> > I see that MIN_STACK_LEFT = 2048 is enough for BUG_ON() handling on both x86_64
> > and x86_32. So I'm going to:
> >  - set MIN_STACK_LEFT to 2048;
> >  - improve the lkdtm test to cover this case.
> > 
> > Mark, Kees, Laura, does it sound good?
> 
> 
> Could you have a look at the following changes in check_alloca() before I send
> the next version?
> 
> If VMAP_STACK is enabled and alloca causes stack depth overflow, I write to
> guard page below the thread stack to cause double fault and VMAP_STACK report.

On arm64 at least, writing to the guard page will not itself trigger a
stack overflow, but will trigger a data abort. I suspect similar is true
on x86, if the stack pointer is sufficiently far above the guard page.

> If VMAP_STACK is disabled, I use MIN_STACK_LEFT = 2048, which seems to be enough
> for BUG_ON() handling both on x86_32 and x86_64. Unfortunately, I can't
> guarantee that it is always enough.

I don't think that we can choose something that's guaranteed to be
sufficient for BUG() handling and also not wasting a tonne of space
under normal operation.

Let's figure out what's going wrong on x86 in the case that you mention,
and try to solve that.

Here I don't think we should reserve space at all -- it's completely
arbitrary, and as above we can't guarantee that it's sufficient anyway.

>  #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> -#define MIN_STACK_LEFT 256
> +#define MIN_STACK_LEFT 2048
> 
>  void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size)
>  {
>         unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
>         struct stack_info stack_info = {0};
>         unsigned long visit_mask = 0;
>         unsigned long stack_left;
> 
>         BUG_ON(get_stack_info(&sp, current, &stack_info, &visit_mask));
> 
>         stack_left = sp - (unsigned long)stack_info.begin;
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
> +       /*
> +        * If alloca oversteps the thread stack boundary, we touch the guard
> +        * page provided by VMAP_STACK to trigger handle_stack_overflow().
> +        */
> +       if (size >= stack_left)
> +               *(stack_info.begin - 1) = 42;
> +#else

On arm64, this won't trigger our stack overflow handler, unless the SP
is already very close to the boundary.

Please just use BUG(). If there is an issue on x86, it would be good to
solve that in the x86 code.

>         BUG_ON(stack_left < MIN_STACK_LEFT ||
>                                 size >= stack_left - MIN_STACK_LEFT);

I really don't think we should bother with this arbitrary offset at all.

Thanks,
Mark.