[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+bV3HQTZ5+ugQmukiiJBkhN_FWqPRuNRYRbe6xoKstWVA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 14 May 2018 07:14:41 +0200
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>
Cc: KVM list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, karahmed@...zon.de,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: CONFIG_KCOV causing crash in svm_vcpu_run()
On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 5:02 AM, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com> wrote:
> Sorry, messed up address for KVM mailing list. See message below.
>
> On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 08:00:07PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
>> With CONFIG_KCOV=y and an AMD processor, running the following program crashes
>> the kernel with no output (I'm testing in a VM, so it's using nested
>> virtualization):
>>
>> #include <fcntl.h>
>> #include <linux/kvm.h>
>> #include <sys/ioctl.h>
>>
>> int main()
>> {
>> int dev, vm, cpu;
>> char page[4096] __attribute__((aligned(4096))) = { 0 };
>> struct kvm_userspace_memory_region memreg = {
>> .memory_size = 4096,
>> .userspace_addr = (unsigned long)page,
>> };
>> dev = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDONLY);
>> vm = ioctl(dev, KVM_CREATE_VM, 0);
>> cpu = ioctl(vm, KVM_CREATE_VCPU, 0);
>> ioctl(vm, KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION, &memreg);
>> ioctl(cpu, KVM_RUN, 0);
>> }
>>
>> It bisects down to commit b2ac58f90540e39 ("KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to
>> MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL"). The bug is apparently that due to the new code for
>> managing the SPEC_CTRL MSR, __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is being called from
>> svm_vcpu_run() before the host's MSR_GS_BASE has been restored, which causes a
>> crash somehow. The following patch fixes it, though I don't know that it's the
>> right solution; maybe KCOV should be disabled in the function instead, or maybe
>> there's a more fundamental problem. What do people think?
If __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() crashes, I would expect there must be
few more of them here:
if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
svm->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
if (svm->spec_ctrl)
native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
Compiler inserts these callbacks into every basic block/edge.. Aren't there?
Unfortunately we don't have an attribute that disables instrumentation
of a single function. This is currently possible only on file level.
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>> index 1fc05e428aba8..d35ef241e66d8 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>> @@ -5652,6 +5652,15 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> #endif
>> );
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> + wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
>> +#else
>> + loadsegment(fs, svm->host.fs);
>> +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
>> + loadsegment(gs, svm->host.gs);
>> +#endif
>> +#endif
>> +
>> /*
>> * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
>> * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
>> @@ -5676,15 +5685,6 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
>> vmexit_fill_RSB();
>>
>> -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> - wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
>> -#else
>> - loadsegment(fs, svm->host.fs);
>> -#ifndef CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
>> - loadsegment(gs, svm->host.gs);
>> -#endif
>> -#endif
>> -
>> reload_tss(vcpu);
>>
>> local_irq_disable();
Powered by blists - more mailing lists