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Message-Id: <1526568530-9144-6-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 17 May 2018 10:48:46 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@...il.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 5/9] ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images
The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures. This
patch differentiates between the kexec_load and kexec_file_load
syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@...nel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 9 +++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 354bb5716ce3..78c15264b17b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
#define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08
#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10
#define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 83f84928ad76..7e1a127f18fe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -442,6 +442,15 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
}
return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
}
+
+ if (!file && read_id == READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) {
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC) &&
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file syscall.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 8bbc18eb07eb..c27f6993b07a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -448,6 +448,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
else if (func == POLICY_CHECK)
return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+ else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+ return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC;
return 0;
}
--
2.7.5
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