Message-ID: <20180522134346.b3bm7ndfjjchju3b@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
Date:   Tue, 22 May 2018 09:43:46 -0400
From:   Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To:     Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:     Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, paul@...l-moore.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] audit: add containerid support for IMA-audit

On 2018-05-21 17:57, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 05/21/2018 02:30 PM, Steve Grubb wrote:
> > Hello Stefan,
> > 
> > On Monday, May 21, 2018 1:53:04 PM EDT Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > On 05/21/2018 12:58 PM, Steve Grubb wrote:
> > > > On Thursday, May 17, 2018 10:18:13 AM EDT Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > > > > audit_log_container_info() then releasing the local context.  This
> > > > > > version of the record has additional concerns covered here:
> > > > > > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/52
> > > > > Following the discussion there and the concern with breaking user space,
> > > > > how can we split up the AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE that is used in
> > > > > ima_audit_measurement() and ima_parse_rule(), without 'breaking user
> > > > > space'?
> > > > > 
> > > > > A message produced by ima_parse_rule() looks like this here:
> > > > > 
> > > > > type=INTEGRITY_RULE msg=audit(1526566213.870:305): action="dont_measure"
> > > > > fsmagic="0x9fa0" res=1
> > > > Why is action and fsmagic being logged as untrusted strings? Untrusted
> > > > strings are used when an unprivileged user can affect the contents of the
> > > > field such as creating a file with space or special characters in the
> > > > name.
> > > > 
> > > > Also, subject and object information is missing. Who loaded this rule?
> > > > 
> > > > > in contrast to that an INTEGRITY_PCR record type:
> > > > > 
> > > > > type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1526566235.193:334): pid=1615 uid=0 auid=0
> > > > > ses=2 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
> > > > > op="invalid_pcr" cause="open_writers" comm="scp"
> > > > > name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="dm-0" ino=1962625 res=1
> > > > Why is op & cause being logged as an untrusted string? This also has
> > > > incomplete subject information.
> > > It's calling audit_log_string() in both cases:
> > > 
> > > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/security/integrity/integrity
> > > _audit.c#L48
> > I see. Looking things over, I see that it seems like it should do the right
> > thing. But the original purpose for this function is here:
> > 
> > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/kernel/audit.c#L1944
> > 
> > This is where it is logging an untrusted string and has to decide to encode
> > it or just place it in quotes. If it has quotes, that means it's an untrusted
> > string but has no control characters in it. I think you want to use
> > audit_log_format() for any string that is trustworthy.
> 
> Replacing all occurrences (in IMA) of audit_log_string() with
> audit_log_format().
> > 
> > 
> > As an aside, I wonder why audit_log_string() is in the API when it is a
> > helper to audit_log_untrustedstring() ?  Without understanding the rules of
> > untrusted strings, it can't be used correctly without re-inventing
> > audit_log_untrustedstring() by hand.
> > 
> > 
> > > > > Should some of the fields from INTEGRITY_PCR also appear in
> > > > > INTEGRITY_RULE? If so, which ones?
> > > > pid, uid, auid, tty, session, subj, comm, exe, res.  <- these are
> > > > required to be searchable
> > > > 
> > > > > We could probably refactor the current  integrity_audit_message() and
> > > > > have ima_parse_rule() call into it to get those fields as well. I
> > > > > suppose adding new fields to it wouldn't be considered breaking user
> > > > > space?
> > > > The audit user space utilities pretty much expects those fields in that
> > > > order for any IMA originating events. You can add things like op or
> > > > cause before
> > > We will call into audit_log_task, which will put the parameters into
> > > correct order:
> > > 
> > > auid uid gid ses subj pid comm exe
> > I'm telling you what the correct order is.  :-)  A long time ago, the IMA
> 
> :-) Thanks. Was getting confused.
> 
> > system had audit events with the order I'm mentioning. For example, here's
> > one from a log I collected back in 2013:
> > 
> > type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1327409021.813:21): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295
> > ses=4294967295 subj=kernel op="add_template_measure" cause="hash_added"
> > comm="init" name="01parse-kernel.sh" dev=rootfs ino=5413 res=0
> > 
> > it was missing "tty" and "exe", but the order is as I mentioned. The
> > expectation is that INTEGRITY events maintain this established order across
> > all events.
> 
> I am *appending* exe= and tty= now:
> 
> type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1526939047.809:305): pid=1609 uid=0 auid=0
> ses=2 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
> op="invalid_pcr" cause="open_writers" comm="ssh"
> name="/var/lib/sss/mc/passwd" dev="dm-0" ino=1962679 res=1
> exe="/usr/bin/ssh" tty=tty2

This isn't necessary since they already covered in the already
connected SYSCALL record which duplicates even more information than is
already.

>    Stefan
> 
> > -Steve
> > 
> > > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/kernel/auditsc.c#L2433
> > > 
> > > > that. The reason why you can do that is those additional fields are not
> > > > required to be searchable by common criteria.
> > > > 
> > > > -Steve

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635

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