linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH ghak32 V2 13/13] debug audit: read container ID of a process

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Tue, 22 May 2018 13:35:41 -0400
From:   Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To:     Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, simo@...hat.com,
        jlayton@...hat.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, dhowells@...hat.com,
        carlos@...hat.com, linux-audit@...hat.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
        luto@...nel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
        serge@...lyn.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH ghak32 V2 13/13] debug audit: read container ID of a
 process

On 2018-05-21 16:06, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, May 21, 2018 at 3:19 PM, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
> > Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com> writes:
> >> On Friday, March 16, 2018 5:00:40 AM EDT Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> >>> Add support for reading the container ID from the proc filesystem.
> >>
> >> I think this could be useful in general. Please consider this to be part of
> >> the full patch set and not something merely used to debug the patches.
> >
> > Only with an audit specific name.
> >
> > As it is:
> >
> > Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
> >
> > The truth is the containerid name really stinks and is quite confusing
> > and does not imply that the label applies only to audit.  And little
> > things like this make me extremely uncofortable with it.
> 
> It also makes the audit container ID (notice how I *always* call it
> the *audit* container ID? that is not an accident) available for
> userspace applications to abuse.  Perhaps in the future we can look at
> ways to make this more available to applications, but this patch is
> not the answer.

Do you have a productive suggestion?

> paul moore

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635