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Date: Tue, 22 May 2018 19:47:19 +0200
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@....net, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: Linux 4.9.102
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index dfd56ec7a850..6d75a9c00e8a 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -355,6 +355,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 5f9e51436a99..52240a63132e 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2699,6 +2699,9 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
to spectre_v2=off.
+ nospec_store_bypass_disable
+ [HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
+
noxsave [BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@@ -3973,6 +3976,48 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
+ spec_store_bypass_disable=
+ [HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
+ (Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)
+
+ Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against a
+ a common industry wide performance optimization known
+ as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which recent stores
+ to the same memory location may not be observed by
+ later loads during speculative execution. The idea
+ is that such stores are unlikely and that they can
+ be detected prior to instruction retirement at the
+ end of a particular speculation execution window.
+
+ In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
+ store can be used in a cache side channel attack, for
+ example to read memory to which the attacker does not
+ directly have access (e.g. inside sandboxed code).
+
+ This parameter controls whether the Speculative Store
+ Bypass optimization is used.
+
+ on - Unconditionally disable Speculative Store Bypass
+ off - Unconditionally enable Speculative Store Bypass
+ auto - Kernel detects whether the CPU model contains an
+ implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and
+ picks the most appropriate mitigation. If the
+ CPU is not vulnerable, "off" is selected. If the
+ CPU is vulnerable the default mitigation is
+ architecture and Kconfig dependent. See below.
+ prctl - Control Speculative Store Bypass per thread
+ via prctl. Speculative Store Bypass is enabled
+ for a process by default. The state of the control
+ is inherited on fork.
+ seccomp - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp threads
+ will disable SSB unless they explicitly opt out.
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ spec_store_bypass_disable=auto.
+
+ Default mitigations:
+ X86: If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
spia_io_base= [HW,MTD]
spia_fio_base=
spia_pedr=
diff --git a/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt b/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..32f3d55c54b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+===================
+Speculation Control
+===================
+
+Quite some CPUs have speculation-related misfeatures which are in
+fact vulnerabilities causing data leaks in various forms even across
+privilege domains.
+
+The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various
+forms. Some of these mitigations are compile-time configurable and some
+can be supplied on the kernel command line.
+
+There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can
+be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled
+environments. The mechanism to control these mitigations is via
+:manpage:`prctl(2)`.
+
+There are two prctl options which are related to this:
+
+ * PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+ * PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+-----------------------
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
+which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-3 with
+the following meaning:
+
+==== ===================== ===================================================
+Bit Define Description
+==== ===================== ===================================================
+0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by
+ PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
+1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
+ disabled.
+2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
+ enabled.
+3 PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but cannot be undone. A
+ subsequent prctl(..., PR_SPEC_ENABLE) will fail.
+==== ===================== ===================================================
+
+If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
+
+If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
+available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
+misfeature will fail.
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+-----------------------
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
+is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand
+in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE or
+PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
+
+Common error codes
+------------------
+======= =================================================================
+Value Meaning
+======= =================================================================
+EINVAL The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused
+ prctl(2) arguments are not 0.
+
+ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature.
+======= =================================================================
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes
+-----------------------------------
+======= =================================================================
+Value Meaning
+======= =================================================================
+0 Success
+
+ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor
+ PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
+
+ENXIO Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible.
+ See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
+
+EPERM Speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller
+ tried to enable it again.
+======= =================================================================
+
+Speculation misfeature controls
+-------------------------------
+- PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: Speculative Store Bypass
+
+ Invocations:
+ * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0);
+ * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+ * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+ * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 7d7bda23db8f..d84c39c290f7 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 9
-SUBLEVEL = 101
+SUBLEVEL = 102
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Roaring Lionus
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
index 12f99fd2e3b2..3aed4492c9a7 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
@@ -534,4 +534,14 @@ THUMB( orr \reg , \reg , #PSR_T_BIT )
#endif
.endm
+#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
+#define _ASM_NOKPROBE(entry) \
+ .pushsection "_kprobe_blacklist", "aw" ; \
+ .balign 4 ; \
+ .long entry; \
+ .popsection
+#else
+#define _ASM_NOKPROBE(entry)
+#endif
+
#endif /* __ASM_ASSEMBLER_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
index d10e36235438..7f66b1b3aca1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
@@ -223,6 +223,22 @@ static inline unsigned int kvm_get_vmid_bits(void)
return 8;
}
+/*
+ * We are not in the kvm->srcu critical section most of the time, so we take
+ * the SRCU read lock here. Since we copy the data from the user page, we
+ * can immediately drop the lock again.
+ */
+static inline int kvm_read_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm,
+ gpa_t gpa, void *data, unsigned long len)
+{
+ int srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+ int ret = kvm_read_guest(kvm, gpa, data, len);
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
{
return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector);
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
index 1b304897aa12..aa316a7562b1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/hardirq.h>
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
@@ -415,7 +416,8 @@ void unregister_undef_hook(struct undef_hook *hook)
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&undef_lock, flags);
}
-static int call_undef_hook(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int instr)
+static nokprobe_inline
+int call_undef_hook(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int instr)
{
struct undef_hook *hook;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs)
arm_notify_die("Oops - undefined instruction", regs, &info, 0, 6);
}
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_undefinstr)
/*
* Handle FIQ similarly to NMI on x86 systems.
diff --git a/arch/arm/lib/getuser.S b/arch/arm/lib/getuser.S
index df73914e81c8..746e7801dcdf 100644
--- a/arch/arm/lib/getuser.S
+++ b/arch/arm/lib/getuser.S
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_1)
mov r0, #0
ret lr
ENDPROC(__get_user_1)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_1)
ENTRY(__get_user_2)
check_uaccess r0, 2, r1, r2, __get_user_bad
@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ rb .req r0
mov r0, #0
ret lr
ENDPROC(__get_user_2)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_2)
ENTRY(__get_user_4)
check_uaccess r0, 4, r1, r2, __get_user_bad
@@ -65,6 +67,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_4)
mov r0, #0
ret lr
ENDPROC(__get_user_4)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_4)
ENTRY(__get_user_8)
check_uaccess r0, 8, r1, r2, __get_user_bad8
@@ -78,6 +81,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8)
mov r0, #0
ret lr
ENDPROC(__get_user_8)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_8)
#ifdef __ARMEB__
ENTRY(__get_user_32t_8)
@@ -91,6 +95,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_32t_8)
mov r0, #0
ret lr
ENDPROC(__get_user_32t_8)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_32t_8)
ENTRY(__get_user_64t_1)
check_uaccess r0, 1, r1, r2, __get_user_bad8
@@ -98,6 +103,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_64t_1)
mov r0, #0
ret lr
ENDPROC(__get_user_64t_1)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_64t_1)
ENTRY(__get_user_64t_2)
check_uaccess r0, 2, r1, r2, __get_user_bad8
@@ -114,6 +120,7 @@ rb .req r0
mov r0, #0
ret lr
ENDPROC(__get_user_64t_2)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_64t_2)
ENTRY(__get_user_64t_4)
check_uaccess r0, 4, r1, r2, __get_user_bad8
@@ -121,6 +128,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_64t_4)
mov r0, #0
ret lr
ENDPROC(__get_user_64t_4)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_64t_4)
#endif
__get_user_bad8:
@@ -131,6 +139,8 @@ __get_user_bad:
ret lr
ENDPROC(__get_user_bad)
ENDPROC(__get_user_bad8)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_bad)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_bad8)
.pushsection __ex_table, "a"
.long 1b, __get_user_bad
diff --git a/arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c b/arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c
index bcdecc25461b..b2aa9b32bff2 100644
--- a/arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c
@@ -165,13 +165,14 @@ optimized_callback(struct optimized_kprobe *op, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct kprobe *p = &op->kp;
- struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb = get_kprobe_ctlblk();
+ struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb;
/* Save skipped registers */
regs->ARM_pc = (unsigned long)op->kp.addr;
regs->ARM_ORIG_r0 = ~0UL;
local_irq_save(flags);
+ kcb = get_kprobe_ctlblk();
if (kprobe_running()) {
kprobes_inc_nmissed_count(&op->kp);
@@ -191,6 +192,7 @@ optimized_callback(struct optimized_kprobe *op, struct pt_regs *regs)
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(optimized_callback)
int arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe(struct optimized_kprobe *op, struct kprobe *orig)
{
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
index 80bf33715ecb..eac73a640ea7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
@@ -313,6 +313,22 @@ static inline unsigned int kvm_get_vmid_bits(void)
return (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(reg, ID_AA64MMFR1_VMIDBITS_SHIFT) == 2) ? 16 : 8;
}
+/*
+ * We are not in the kvm->srcu critical section most of the time, so we take
+ * the SRCU read lock here. Since we copy the data from the user page, we
+ * can immediately drop the lock again.
+ */
+static inline int kvm_read_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm,
+ gpa_t gpa, void *data, unsigned long len)
+{
+ int srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+ int ret = kvm_read_guest(kvm, gpa, data, len);
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
#include <asm/mmu.h>
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c
index f516ac508ae3..bf0f712ac0e0 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c
@@ -228,14 +228,6 @@ static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
unsigned short maj;
unsigned short min;
- /* We only show online cpus: disable preempt (overzealous, I
- * knew) to prevent cpu going down. */
- preempt_disable();
- if (!cpu_online(cpu_id)) {
- preempt_enable();
- return 0;
- }
-
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
pvr = per_cpu(cpu_pvr, cpu_id);
#else
@@ -340,9 +332,6 @@ static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
seq_printf(m, "\n");
#endif
-
- preempt_enable();
-
/* If this is the last cpu, print the summary */
if (cpumask_next(cpu_id, cpu_online_mask) >= nr_cpu_ids)
show_cpuinfo_summary(m);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c
index 1bceb95f422d..5584247f5029 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ static ssize_t opal_nvram_read(char *buf, size_t count, loff_t *index)
return count;
}
+/*
+ * This can be called in the panic path with interrupts off, so use
+ * mdelay in that case.
+ */
static ssize_t opal_nvram_write(char *buf, size_t count, loff_t *index)
{
s64 rc = OPAL_BUSY;
@@ -58,10 +62,16 @@ static ssize_t opal_nvram_write(char *buf, size_t count, loff_t *index)
while (rc == OPAL_BUSY || rc == OPAL_BUSY_EVENT) {
rc = opal_write_nvram(__pa(buf), count, off);
if (rc == OPAL_BUSY_EVENT) {
- msleep(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
+ if (in_interrupt() || irqs_disabled())
+ mdelay(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
+ else
+ msleep(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
opal_poll_events(NULL);
} else if (rc == OPAL_BUSY) {
- msleep(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
+ if (in_interrupt() || irqs_disabled())
+ mdelay(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
+ else
+ msleep(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
}
}
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/irq.c b/arch/s390/kernel/irq.c
index 285d6561076d..7ff976737bb1 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/irq.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/irq.c
@@ -173,10 +173,9 @@ void do_softirq_own_stack(void)
new -= STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD;
((struct stack_frame *) new)->back_chain = old;
asm volatile(" la 15,0(%0)\n"
- " basr 14,%2\n"
+ " brasl 14,__do_softirq\n"
" la 15,0(%1)\n"
- : : "a" (new), "a" (old),
- "a" (__do_softirq)
+ : : "a" (new), "a" (old)
: "0", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "14",
"cc", "memory" );
} else {
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c
index fcc634c1479a..96e4fcad57bf 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c
@@ -739,6 +739,10 @@ static int __hw_perf_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
*/
rate = 0;
if (attr->freq) {
+ if (!attr->sample_freq) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
rate = freq_to_sample_rate(&si, attr->sample_freq);
rate = hw_limit_rate(&si, rate);
attr->freq = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index cc69e37548db..c0ad1bb27fa2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -330,7 +330,8 @@ __setup_efi_pci32(efi_pci_io_protocol_32 *pci, struct pci_setup_rom **__rom)
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto free_struct;
- memcpy(rom->romdata, pci->romimage, pci->romsize);
+ memcpy(rom->romdata, (void *)(unsigned long)pci->romimage,
+ pci->romsize);
return status;
free_struct:
@@ -436,7 +437,8 @@ __setup_efi_pci64(efi_pci_io_protocol_64 *pci, struct pci_setup_rom **__rom)
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto free_struct;
- memcpy(rom->romdata, pci->romimage, pci->romsize);
+ memcpy(rom->romdata, (void *)(unsigned long)pci->romimage,
+ pci->romsize);
return status;
free_struct:
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index a2485311164b..c278f276c9b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -197,6 +197,9 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD ( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+
#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
/* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */
@@ -204,6 +207,13 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD ( 7*32+24) /* "" AMD SSBD implementation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
+
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -261,9 +271,10 @@
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (ebx), word 13 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+0) /* CLZERO instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+1) /* Instructions Retired Count */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB (13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB (13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
/* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (eax), word 14 */
#define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@@ -299,6 +310,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */
#define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+3) /* Scalable MCA */
+
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
@@ -306,6 +318,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
/*
* BUG word(s)
@@ -335,5 +348,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 20cfeeb681c6..7598a6c26f76 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
int (*hardware_setup)(void); /* __init */
void (*hardware_unsetup)(void); /* __exit */
bool (*cpu_has_accelerated_tpr)(void);
- bool (*cpu_has_high_real_mode_segbase)(void);
+ bool (*has_emulated_msr)(int index);
void (*cpuid_update)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 5a295bb97103..733650874b30 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
- /* pkey 0 is the default and always allocated */
+ /* pkey 0 is the default and allocated implicitly */
mm->context.pkey_allocation_map = 0x1;
/* -1 means unallocated or invalid */
mm->context.execute_only_pkey = -1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index c768bc1550a1..1ec13e253174 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -61,6 +63,11 @@
#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO (1 << 4) /*
+ * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
+ * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
+ * control required.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e
@@ -135,6 +142,7 @@
/* DEBUGCTLMSR bits (others vary by model): */
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR (1UL << 0) /* last branch recording */
+#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF_SHIFT 1
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF (1UL << 1) /* single-step on branches */
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_TR (1UL << 6)
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS (1UL << 7)
@@ -315,6 +323,8 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA4 0xc001103d
#define MSR_AMD64_IBS_REG_COUNT_MAX 8 /* includes MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET */
+#define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
+
/* Fam 17h MSRs */
#define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index f928ad9b143f..8b38df98548e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -217,6 +217,14 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
};
+/* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
+enum ssb_mitigation {
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
+};
+
extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
@@ -241,22 +249,27 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
#endif
}
-#define alternative_msr_write(_msr, _val, _feature) \
- asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", \
- "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t" \
- "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" \
- "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" \
- "wrmsr", \
- _feature) \
- : : [msr] "i" (_msr), [val] "i" (_val) \
- : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory")
+static __always_inline
+void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
+{
+ asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
+ : : "c" (msr),
+ "a" ((u32)val),
+ "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
+ [feature] "i" (feature)
+ : "memory");
+}
static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
{
- alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB,
- X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+ u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
+
+ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
}
+/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
+extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+
/*
* With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
* before calling into firmware.
@@ -265,14 +278,18 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
*/
#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \
do { \
+ u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \
+ \
preempt_disable(); \
- alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, \
+ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
} while (0)
#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \
do { \
- alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0, \
+ u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \
+ \
+ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
preempt_enable(); \
} while (0)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
index b3b09b98896d..c50d6dcf4a22 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
#define _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
+#define ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY 0
+
#define arch_max_pkey() (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE) ? 16 : 1)
extern int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
@@ -14,7 +16,7 @@ extern int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm);
static inline int execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
- return 0;
+ return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY;
return __execute_only_pkey(mm);
}
@@ -48,13 +50,21 @@ bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
{
/*
* "Allocated" pkeys are those that have been returned
- * from pkey_alloc(). pkey 0 is special, and never
- * returned from pkey_alloc().
+ * from pkey_alloc() or pkey 0 which is allocated
+ * implicitly when the mm is created.
*/
- if (pkey <= 0)
+ if (pkey < 0)
return false;
if (pkey >= arch_max_pkey())
return false;
+ /*
+ * The exec-only pkey is set in the allocation map, but
+ * is not available to any of the user interfaces like
+ * mprotect_pkey().
+ */
+ if (pkey == mm->context.execute_only_pkey)
+ return false;
+
return mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) & (1U << pkey);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ae7c2c5cd7f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_SPECCTRL_H_
+#define _ASM_X86_SPECCTRL_H_
+
+#include <linux/thread_info.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
+/*
+ * On VMENTER we must preserve whatever view of the SPEC_CTRL MSR
+ * the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This
+ * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or
+ * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case.
+ * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter and also
+ * the guest's version of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, if emulated.
+ */
+extern void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool guest);
+
+/**
+ * x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest - Set speculation control registers for the guest
+ * @guest_spec_ctrl: The guest content of MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+ * @guest_virt_spec_ctrl: The guest controlled bits of MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
+ * (may get translated to MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG bits)
+ *
+ * Avoids writing to the MSR if the content/bits are the same
+ */
+static inline
+void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl)
+{
+ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(guest_spec_ctrl, guest_virt_spec_ctrl, true);
+}
+
+/**
+ * x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host - Restore host speculation control registers
+ * @guest_spec_ctrl: The guest content of MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+ * @guest_virt_spec_ctrl: The guest controlled bits of MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
+ * (may get translated to MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG bits)
+ *
+ * Avoids writing to the MSR if the content/bits are the same
+ */
+static inline
+void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl)
+{
+ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(guest_spec_ctrl, guest_virt_spec_ctrl, false);
+}
+
+/* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
+extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
+extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
+
+static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
+{
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
+ return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(u64 spec_ctrl)
+{
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
+ return (spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) << (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
+}
+
+static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
+{
+ return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+extern void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void);
+#else
+static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { }
+#endif
+
+extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tif);
+
+static inline void speculative_store_bypass_update_current(void)
+{
+ speculative_store_bypass_update(current_thread_info()->flags);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 89978b9c667a..2d8788a59b4d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct thread_info {
#define TIF_SIGPENDING 2 /* signal pending */
#define TIF_NEED_RESCHED 3 /* rescheduling necessary */
#define TIF_SINGLESTEP 4 /* reenable singlestep on user return*/
+#define TIF_SSBD 5 /* Reduced data speculation */
#define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU 6 /* syscall emulation active */
#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */
#define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* secure computing */
@@ -104,8 +105,9 @@ struct thread_info {
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
#define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
-#define _TIF_SINGLESTEP (1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP)
#define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
+#define _TIF_SINGLESTEP (1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP)
+#define _TIF_SSBD (1 << TIF_SSBD)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
@@ -139,7 +141,7 @@ struct thread_info {
/* flags to check in __switch_to() */
#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW \
- (_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP)
+ (_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_SSBD)
#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
index 99185a064978..686a58d793e5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -111,6 +111,16 @@ static inline void cr4_clear_bits(unsigned long mask)
}
}
+static inline void cr4_toggle_bits(unsigned long mask)
+{
+ unsigned long cr4;
+
+ cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
+ cr4 ^= mask;
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, cr4);
+ __write_cr4(cr4);
+}
+
/* Read the CR4 shadow. */
static inline unsigned long cr4_read_shadow(void)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index c375bc672f82..4c2be99fa0fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/smp.h>
#include <asm/pci-direct.h>
#include <asm/delay.h>
@@ -542,6 +543,26 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value);
nodes_per_socket = ((value >> 3) & 7) + 1;
}
+
+ if (c->x86 >= 0x15 && c->x86 <= 0x17) {
+ unsigned int bit;
+
+ switch (c->x86) {
+ case 0x15: bit = 54; break;
+ case 0x16: bit = 33; break;
+ case 0x17: bit = 10; break;
+ default: return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Try to cache the base value so further operations can
+ * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable SSBD.
+ */
+ if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+ x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask = 1ULL << bit;
+ }
+ }
}
static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -728,6 +749,17 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
+static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN);
+ /*
+ * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. It affects
+ * all up to and including B1.
+ */
+ if (c->x86_model <= 1 && c->x86_stepping <= 1)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+}
+
static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u32 dummy;
@@ -758,6 +790,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
case 0x10: init_amd_gh(c); break;
case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break;
case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break;
+ case 0x17: init_amd_zn(c); break;
}
/* Enable workaround for FXSAVE leak */
@@ -824,8 +857,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOW) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_LM))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH);
- /* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET */
- set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
+ /* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b8b0b6e78371..86af9b1b049d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -11,8 +11,10 @@
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
-#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -26,6 +28,27 @@
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
+
+/*
+ * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
+ * writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set.
+ */
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+/*
+ * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
+ * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
+ */
+static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+
+/*
+ * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
+ * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
+ */
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
@@ -36,9 +59,27 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
}
+ /*
+ * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
+ * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
+ * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+ /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+ x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+ /*
+ * Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store
+ * Bypass vulnerability.
+ */
+ ssb_select_mitigation();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -92,7 +133,76 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
-static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
+ SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+void
+x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
+{
+ u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+ struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
+
+ /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+ /*
+ * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
+ * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
+ * modifiable bits from the guest value.
+ */
+ guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
+ guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
+
+ /* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
+ hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+
+ if (hostval != guestval) {
+ msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If SSBD is not handled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL on AMD, update
+ * MSR_AMD64_L2_CFG or MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if supported.
+ */
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
+ !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * If the host has SSBD mitigation enabled, force it in the host's
+ * virtual MSR value. If its not permanently enabled, evaluate
+ * current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.
+ */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
+ hostval = SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ else
+ hostval = ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+
+ /* Sanitize the guest value */
+ guestval = guest_virt_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+
+ if (hostval != guestval) {
+ unsigned long tif;
+
+ tif = setguest ? ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(guestval) :
+ ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(hostval);
+
+ speculative_store_bypass_update(tif);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl);
+
+static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
+{
+ u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
+ else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
+}
#ifdef RETPOLINE
static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
@@ -311,32 +421,289 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
}
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation ssb_mode __ro_after_init = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+
+/* The kernel command line selection */
+enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP,
+};
+
+static const char *ssb_strings[] = {
+ [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
+ [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled",
+ [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl",
+ [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp",
+};
+
+static const struct {
+ const char *option;
+ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+} ssb_mitigation_options[] = {
+ { "auto", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO }, /* Platform decides */
+ { "on", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
+ { "off", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE }, /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
+ { "prctl", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl */
+ { "seccomp", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl and seccomp */
+};
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+ char arg[20];
+ int ret, i;
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+ return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
+ } else {
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
+ arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
+ if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
+ continue;
+
+ cmd = ssb_mitigation_options[i].cmd;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
+ pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+ return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return cmd;
+}
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
+ return mode;
+
+ cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS) &&
+ (cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE ||
+ cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO))
+ return mode;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP:
+ /*
+ * Choose prctl+seccomp as the default mode if seccomp is
+ * enabled.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+ mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP;
+ else
+ mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+ break;
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
+ mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
+ break;
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
+ mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+ break;
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
+ * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
+ * - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
+ * - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
+ */
+ if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
+ /*
+ * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD uses
+ * a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
+ */
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ break;
+ case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+ x86_amd_ssb_disable();
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return mode;
+}
+
+static void ssb_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ ssb_mode = __ssb_select_mitigation();
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+ pr_info("%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculation prctl: " fmt
+
+static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ bool update;
+
+ if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL &&
+ ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ switch (ctrl) {
+ case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+ /* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */
+ if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+ return -EPERM;
+ task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+ task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
+ update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If being set on non-current task, delay setting the CPU
+ * mitigation until it is next scheduled.
+ */
+ if (task == current && update)
+ speculative_store_bypass_update_current();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
+ unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ switch (which) {
+ case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+ return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+ default:
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
+ ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ switch (ssb_mode) {
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
+ return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP:
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
+ if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+ if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ default:
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+ return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+ }
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
+{
+ switch (which) {
+ case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+ return ssb_prctl_get(task);
+ default:
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+}
+
+void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+ if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
+ x86_amd_ssb_disable();
+}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
-ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+
+static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
- return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+
+ switch (bug) {
+ case X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+
+ break;
+
+ case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+
+ case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
+ spectre_v2_module_string());
+
+ case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+}
+
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
- return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
- return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+}
- return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
- spectre_v2_module_string());
+ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 301bbd1f2373..b0fd028b2eee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -725,17 +725,32 @@ static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also,
* a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on
* Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available.
- *
- * We use the AMD bits in 0x8000_0008 EBX as the generic hardware
- * features, which are visible in /proc/cpuinfo and used by the
- * kernel. So set those accordingly from the Intel bits.
*/
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
}
+
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
+ }
}
void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -879,21 +894,55 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = {
{}
};
-static bool __init cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_spec_store_bypass[] = {
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1 },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM },
+ { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5, },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5, },
+ { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5, },
+ { X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x12, },
+ { X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x11, },
+ { X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x10, },
+ { X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0xf, },
+ { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4, },
+ {}
+};
+
+static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 ia32_cap = 0;
- if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
- return false;
-
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
+ if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
+
+ if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
+ return;
+
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+
+ if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
+ return;
+
/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
- return false;
+ return;
- return true;
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
}
/*
@@ -942,12 +991,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
- if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation)) {
- if (cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(c))
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
- }
+ cpu_set_bug_bits(c);
fpu__init_system(c);
@@ -1315,6 +1359,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
#endif
mtrr_ap_init();
validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
+ x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
}
struct msr_range {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
index 2584265d4745..3b19d82f7932 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -46,4 +46,7 @@ extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[],
extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
+
#endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 8fb1d6522f8e..93781e3f05b2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -153,7 +153,10 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index a55b32007785..00a9047539d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <asm/mce.h>
#include <asm/vm86.h>
#include <asm/switch_to.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
/*
* per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
@@ -134,11 +135,6 @@ void flush_thread(void)
fpu__clear(&tsk->thread.fpu);
}
-static void hard_disable_TSC(void)
-{
- cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
-}
-
void disable_TSC(void)
{
preempt_disable();
@@ -147,15 +143,10 @@ void disable_TSC(void)
* Must flip the CPU state synchronously with
* TIF_NOTSC in the current running context.
*/
- hard_disable_TSC();
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
preempt_enable();
}
-static void hard_enable_TSC(void)
-{
- cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
-}
-
static void enable_TSC(void)
{
preempt_disable();
@@ -164,7 +155,7 @@ static void enable_TSC(void)
* Must flip the CPU state synchronously with
* TIF_NOTSC in the current running context.
*/
- hard_enable_TSC();
+ cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
preempt_enable();
}
@@ -192,48 +183,199 @@ int set_tsc_mode(unsigned int val)
return 0;
}
-void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
- struct tss_struct *tss)
+static inline void switch_to_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss,
+ struct thread_struct *prev,
+ struct thread_struct *next,
+ unsigned long tifp, unsigned long tifn)
{
- struct thread_struct *prev, *next;
-
- prev = &prev_p->thread;
- next = &next_p->thread;
-
- if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP) ^
- test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP)) {
- unsigned long debugctl = get_debugctlmsr();
-
- debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
- if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP))
- debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
-
- update_debugctlmsr(debugctl);
- }
-
- if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_NOTSC) ^
- test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_NOTSC)) {
- /* prev and next are different */
- if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_NOTSC))
- hard_disable_TSC();
- else
- hard_enable_TSC();
- }
-
- if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_IO_BITMAP)) {
+ if (tifn & _TIF_IO_BITMAP) {
/*
* Copy the relevant range of the IO bitmap.
* Normally this is 128 bytes or less:
*/
memcpy(tss->io_bitmap, next->io_bitmap_ptr,
max(prev->io_bitmap_max, next->io_bitmap_max));
- } else if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_IO_BITMAP)) {
+ } else if (tifp & _TIF_IO_BITMAP) {
/*
* Clear any possible leftover bits:
*/
memset(tss->io_bitmap, 0xff, prev->io_bitmap_max);
}
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+
+struct ssb_state {
+ struct ssb_state *shared_state;
+ raw_spinlock_t lock;
+ unsigned int disable_state;
+ unsigned long local_state;
+};
+
+#define LSTATE_SSB 0
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct ssb_state, ssb_state);
+
+void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void)
+{
+ struct ssb_state *st = this_cpu_ptr(&ssb_state);
+ unsigned int this_cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ unsigned int cpu;
+
+ st->local_state = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Shared state setup happens once on the first bringup
+ * of the CPU. It's not destroyed on CPU hotunplug.
+ */
+ if (st->shared_state)
+ return;
+
+ raw_spin_lock_init(&st->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Go over HT siblings and check whether one of them has set up the
+ * shared state pointer already.
+ */
+ for_each_cpu(cpu, topology_sibling_cpumask(this_cpu)) {
+ if (cpu == this_cpu)
+ continue;
+
+ if (!per_cpu(ssb_state, cpu).shared_state)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Link it to the state of the sibling: */
+ st->shared_state = per_cpu(ssb_state, cpu).shared_state;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * First HT sibling to come up on the core. Link shared state of
+ * the first HT sibling to itself. The siblings on the same core
+ * which come up later will see the shared state pointer and link
+ * themself to the state of this CPU.
+ */
+ st->shared_state = st;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Logic is: First HT sibling enables SSBD for both siblings in the core
+ * and last sibling to disable it, disables it for the whole core. This how
+ * MSR_SPEC_CTRL works in "hardware":
+ *
+ * CORE_SPEC_CTRL = THREAD0_SPEC_CTRL | THREAD1_SPEC_CTRL
+ */
+static __always_inline void amd_set_core_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+ struct ssb_state *st = this_cpu_ptr(&ssb_state);
+ u64 msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN)) {
+ msr |= ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) {
+ /*
+ * Since this can race with prctl(), block reentry on the
+ * same CPU.
+ */
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(LSTATE_SSB, &st->local_state))
+ return;
+
+ msr |= x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
+
+ raw_spin_lock(&st->shared_state->lock);
+ /* First sibling enables SSBD: */
+ if (!st->shared_state->disable_state)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+ st->shared_state->disable_state++;
+ raw_spin_unlock(&st->shared_state->lock);
+ } else {
+ if (!__test_and_clear_bit(LSTATE_SSB, &st->local_state))
+ return;
+
+ raw_spin_lock(&st->shared_state->lock);
+ st->shared_state->disable_state--;
+ if (!st->shared_state->disable_state)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+ raw_spin_unlock(&st->shared_state->lock);
+ }
+}
+#else
+static __always_inline void amd_set_core_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+ u64 msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+}
+#endif
+
+static __always_inline void amd_set_ssb_virt_state(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+ /*
+ * SSBD has the same definition in SPEC_CTRL and VIRT_SPEC_CTRL,
+ * so ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl() just works.
+ */
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn));
+}
+
+static __always_inline void intel_set_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+ u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void __speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn);
+ else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
+ amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
+ else
+ intel_set_ssb_state(tifn);
+}
+
+void speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tif)
+{
+ preempt_disable();
+ __speculative_store_bypass_update(tif);
+ preempt_enable();
+}
+
+void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
+ struct tss_struct *tss)
+{
+ struct thread_struct *prev, *next;
+ unsigned long tifp, tifn;
+
+ prev = &prev_p->thread;
+ next = &next_p->thread;
+
+ tifn = READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(next_p)->flags);
+ tifp = READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(prev_p)->flags);
+ switch_to_bitmap(tss, prev, next, tifp, tifn);
+
propagate_user_return_notify(prev_p, next_p);
+
+ if ((tifp & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP || tifn & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP) &&
+ arch_has_block_step()) {
+ unsigned long debugctl, msk;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctl);
+ debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
+ msk = tifn & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP;
+ debugctl |= (msk >> TIF_BLOCKSTEP) << DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF_SHIFT;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctl);
+ }
+
+ if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOTSC)
+ cr4_toggle_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
+
+ if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD)
+ __speculative_store_bypass_update(tifn);
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index 83929cc47a4b..cb945146b7c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
#include <asm/i8259.h>
#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include <asm/misc.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
/* Number of siblings per CPU package */
int smp_num_siblings = 1;
@@ -229,6 +230,8 @@ static void notrace start_secondary(void *unused)
*/
check_tsc_sync_target();
+ speculative_store_bypass_ht_init();
+
/*
* Lock vector_lock and initialize the vectors on this cpu
* before setting the cpu online. We must set it online with
@@ -1325,6 +1328,8 @@ void __init native_smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
set_mtrr_aps_delayed_init();
smp_quirk_init_udelay();
+
+ speculative_store_bypass_ht_init();
}
void arch_enable_nonboot_cpus_begin(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 93f924de06cf..a69f18d4676c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
/* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */
const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features =
- F(IBPB) | F(IBRS);
+ F(AMD_IBPB) | F(AMD_IBRS) | F(VIRT_SSBD);
/* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */
const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features =
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
- F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
+ F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
get_cpu();
@@ -618,13 +618,20 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
g_phys_as = phys_as;
entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
entry->edx = 0;
- /* IBRS and IBPB aren't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
- entry->ebx |= F(IBPB);
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
- entry->ebx |= F(IBRS);
+ /*
+ * IBRS, IBPB and VIRT_SSBD aren't necessarily present in
+ * hardware cpuid
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
+ entry->ebx |= F(AMD_IBPB);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
+ entry->ebx |= F(AMD_IBRS);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ entry->ebx |= F(VIRT_SSBD);
entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features;
cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
+ entry->ebx |= F(VIRT_SSBD);
break;
}
case 0x80000019:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index d1beb7156704..c38369781239 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -165,21 +165,21 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0);
- if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)))
+ if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB)))
return true;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL));
}
-static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_spec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0);
- if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)))
+ if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)))
return true;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
- return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL));
+ return best && (best->edx & (bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) | bit(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -190,6 +190,15 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES));
}
+static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_virt_ssbd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+ best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0);
+ return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD));
+}
+
+
/*
* NRIPS is provided through cpuidfn 0x8000000a.edx bit 3
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index aaa93b4b0380..a27f9e442ffc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
#include <asm/microcode.h>
-#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/virtext.h>
#include "trace.h"
@@ -185,6 +185,12 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
} host;
u64 spec_ctrl;
+ /*
+ * Contains guest-controlled bits of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, which will be
+ * translated into the appropriate L2_CFG bits on the host to
+ * perform speculative control.
+ */
+ u64 virt_spec_ctrl;
u32 *msrpm;
@@ -1561,6 +1567,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
u32 eax = 1;
svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
+ svm->virt_spec_ctrl = 0;
if (!init_event) {
svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE |
@@ -3545,11 +3552,18 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
break;
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+ !guest_cpuid_has_spec_ctrl(vcpu))
return 1;
msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
break;
+ case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has_virt_ssbd(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ msr_info->data = svm->virt_spec_ctrl;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
msr_info->data = 0x01000065;
break;
@@ -3643,7 +3657,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
break;
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+ !guest_cpuid_has_spec_ctrl(vcpu))
return 1;
/* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
@@ -3684,6 +3698,16 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
break;
set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0, 1);
break;
+ case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has_virt_ssbd(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (data & ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)
+ return 1;
+
+ svm->virt_spec_ctrl = data;
+ break;
case MSR_STAR:
svm->vmcb->save.star = data;
break;
@@ -4917,8 +4941,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
* being speculatively taken.
*/
- if (svm->spec_ctrl)
- native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
+ x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
asm volatile (
"push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t"
@@ -5012,6 +5035,18 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#endif
);
+ /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+ vmexit_fill_RSB();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
+#else
+ loadsegment(fs, svm->host.fs);
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
+ loadsegment(gs, svm->host.gs);
+#endif
+#endif
+
/*
* We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
* SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
@@ -5030,20 +5065,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
svm->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
- if (svm->spec_ctrl)
- native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
-
- /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
- vmexit_fill_RSB();
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
-#else
- loadsegment(fs, svm->host.fs);
-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
- loadsegment(gs, svm->host.gs);
-#endif
-#endif
+ x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
reload_tss(vcpu);
@@ -5145,7 +5167,7 @@ static bool svm_cpu_has_accelerated_tpr(void)
return false;
}
-static bool svm_has_high_real_mode_segbase(void)
+static bool svm_has_emulated_msr(int index)
{
return true;
}
@@ -5462,7 +5484,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
.hardware_enable = svm_hardware_enable,
.hardware_disable = svm_hardware_disable,
.cpu_has_accelerated_tpr = svm_cpu_has_accelerated_tpr,
- .cpu_has_high_real_mode_segbase = svm_has_high_real_mode_segbase,
+ .has_emulated_msr = svm_has_emulated_msr,
.vcpu_create = svm_create_vcpu,
.vcpu_free = svm_free_vcpu,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index b978aeccda78..d92523afb425 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
#include <asm/microcode.h>
-#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include "trace.h"
#include "pmu.h"
@@ -3020,7 +3020,7 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
break;
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+ !guest_cpuid_has_spec_ctrl(vcpu))
return 1;
msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
@@ -3137,11 +3137,11 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
break;
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+ !guest_cpuid_has_spec_ctrl(vcpu))
return 1;
/* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
- if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP))
+ if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
return 1;
vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
@@ -8691,9 +8691,21 @@ static void vmx_handle_external_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}
-static bool vmx_has_high_real_mode_segbase(void)
+static bool vmx_has_emulated_msr(int index)
{
- return enable_unrestricted_guest || emulate_invalid_guest_state;
+ switch (index) {
+ case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
+ /*
+ * We cannot do SMM unless we can run the guest in big
+ * real mode.
+ */
+ return enable_unrestricted_guest || emulate_invalid_guest_state;
+ case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+ /* This is AMD only. */
+ return false;
+ default:
+ return true;
+ }
}
static bool vmx_mpx_supported(void)
@@ -8916,10 +8928,10 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
* being speculatively taken.
*/
- if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
- native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
+ x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
+
asm(
/* Store host registers */
"push %%" _ASM_DX "; push %%" _ASM_BP ";"
@@ -9055,8 +9067,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
- if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
- native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+ x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
vmexit_fill_RSB();
@@ -11347,7 +11358,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
.hardware_enable = hardware_enable,
.hardware_disable = hardware_disable,
.cpu_has_accelerated_tpr = report_flexpriority,
- .cpu_has_high_real_mode_segbase = vmx_has_high_real_mode_segbase,
+ .has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
.vcpu_create = vmx_create_vcpu,
.vcpu_free = vmx_free_vcpu,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 3aaaf305420d..a0cb85f30c94 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1002,6 +1002,7 @@ static u32 emulated_msrs[] = {
MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL,
MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL,
MSR_IA32_SMBASE,
+ MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL,
};
static unsigned num_emulated_msrs;
@@ -2664,7 +2665,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
* fringe case that is not enabled except via specific settings
* of the module parameters.
*/
- r = kvm_x86_ops->cpu_has_high_real_mode_segbase();
+ r = kvm_x86_ops->has_emulated_msr(MSR_IA32_SMBASE);
break;
case KVM_CAP_COALESCED_MMIO:
r = KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_PAGE_OFFSET;
@@ -4226,14 +4227,8 @@ static void kvm_init_msr_list(void)
num_msrs_to_save = j;
for (i = j = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(emulated_msrs); i++) {
- switch (emulated_msrs[i]) {
- case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
- if (!kvm_x86_ops->cpu_has_high_real_mode_segbase())
- continue;
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
+ if (!kvm_x86_ops->has_emulated_msr(emulated_msrs[i]))
+ continue;
if (j < i)
emulated_msrs[j] = emulated_msrs[i];
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
index f88ce0e5efd9..0bbec041c003 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
@@ -95,26 +95,27 @@ int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey
*/
if (pkey != -1)
return pkey;
- /*
- * Look for a protection-key-drive execute-only mapping
- * which is now being given permissions that are not
- * execute-only. Move it back to the default pkey.
- */
- if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) &&
- (prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE))) {
- return 0;
- }
+
/*
* The mapping is execute-only. Go try to get the
* execute-only protection key. If we fail to do that,
* fall through as if we do not have execute-only
- * support.
+ * support in this mm.
*/
if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
if (pkey > 0)
return pkey;
+ } else if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma)) {
+ /*
+ * Protections are *not* PROT_EXEC, but the mapping
+ * is using the exec-only pkey. This mapping was
+ * PROT_EXEC and will no longer be. Move back to
+ * the default pkey.
+ */
+ return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY;
}
+
/*
* This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to
* setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
index 2bea87cc0ff2..081437b5f381 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
@@ -1977,10 +1977,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_hvm_need_lapic);
static void xen_set_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
- if (xen_pv_domain()) {
- clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
+ if (xen_pv_domain())
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV);
- }
}
static void xen_pin_vcpu(int cpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
index 418f1b8576cf..c92f75f7ae33 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
@@ -1317,8 +1317,6 @@ void xen_flush_tlb_all(void)
struct mmuext_op *op;
struct multicall_space mcs;
- trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb_all(0);
-
preempt_disable();
mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*op));
@@ -1336,8 +1334,6 @@ static void xen_flush_tlb(void)
struct mmuext_op *op;
struct multicall_space mcs;
- trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb(0);
-
preempt_disable();
mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*op));
diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
index 56b6c8508a89..cbb1cc6bbdb4 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -519,14 +519,22 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
&dev_attr_spectre_v1.attr,
&dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
+ &dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
NULL
};
diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-core.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-core.c
index 340e037b3224..884c1ec61ac9 100644
--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-core.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-core.c
@@ -507,7 +507,10 @@ static void i2c_dw_xfer_init(struct dw_i2c_dev *dev)
i2c_dw_disable_int(dev);
/* Enable the adapter */
- __i2c_dw_enable_and_wait(dev, true);
+ __i2c_dw_enable(dev, true);
+
+ /* Dummy read to avoid the register getting stuck on Bay Trail */
+ dw_readl(dev, DW_IC_ENABLE_STATUS);
/* Clear and enable interrupts */
dw_readl(dev, DW_IC_CLR_INTR);
diff --git a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c
index 48b3866a9ded..35286907c636 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static int __qdio_allocate_qs(struct qdio_q **irq_ptr_qs, int nr_queues)
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_queues; i++) {
- q = kmem_cache_alloc(qdio_q_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+ q = kmem_cache_zalloc(qdio_q_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!q)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -456,7 +456,6 @@ int qdio_setup_irq(struct qdio_initialize *init_data)
{
struct ciw *ciw;
struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr = init_data->cdev->private->qdio_data;
- int rc;
memset(&irq_ptr->qib, 0, sizeof(irq_ptr->qib));
memset(&irq_ptr->siga_flag, 0, sizeof(irq_ptr->siga_flag));
@@ -493,16 +492,14 @@ int qdio_setup_irq(struct qdio_initialize *init_data)
ciw = ccw_device_get_ciw(init_data->cdev, CIW_TYPE_EQUEUE);
if (!ciw) {
DBF_ERROR("%4x NO EQ", irq_ptr->schid.sch_no);
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out_err;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
irq_ptr->equeue = *ciw;
ciw = ccw_device_get_ciw(init_data->cdev, CIW_TYPE_AQUEUE);
if (!ciw) {
DBF_ERROR("%4x NO AQ", irq_ptr->schid.sch_no);
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out_err;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
irq_ptr->aqueue = *ciw;
@@ -510,9 +507,6 @@ int qdio_setup_irq(struct qdio_initialize *init_data)
irq_ptr->orig_handler = init_data->cdev->handler;
init_data->cdev->handler = qdio_int_handler;
return 0;
-out_err:
- qdio_release_memory(irq_ptr);
- return rc;
}
void qdio_print_subchannel_info(struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr,
diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c
index 7d629b4e1ecc..adc3f56d4773 100644
--- a/drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c
+++ b/drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ static int bcm_qspi_bspi_set_mode(struct bcm_qspi *qspi,
static void bcm_qspi_enable_bspi(struct bcm_qspi *qspi)
{
- if (!has_bspi(qspi) || (qspi->bspi_enabled))
+ if (!has_bspi(qspi))
return;
qspi->bspi_enabled = 1;
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static void bcm_qspi_enable_bspi(struct bcm_qspi *qspi)
static void bcm_qspi_disable_bspi(struct bcm_qspi *qspi)
{
- if (!has_bspi(qspi) || (!qspi->bspi_enabled))
+ if (!has_bspi(qspi))
return;
qspi->bspi_enabled = 0;
@@ -543,16 +543,19 @@ static void bcm_qspi_disable_bspi(struct bcm_qspi *qspi)
static void bcm_qspi_chip_select(struct bcm_qspi *qspi, int cs)
{
- u32 data = 0;
+ u32 rd = 0;
+ u32 wr = 0;
- if (qspi->curr_cs == cs)
- return;
if (qspi->base[CHIP_SELECT]) {
- data = bcm_qspi_read(qspi, CHIP_SELECT, 0);
- data = (data & ~0xff) | (1 << cs);
- bcm_qspi_write(qspi, CHIP_SELECT, 0, data);
+ rd = bcm_qspi_read(qspi, CHIP_SELECT, 0);
+ wr = (rd & ~0xff) | (1 << cs);
+ if (rd == wr)
+ return;
+ bcm_qspi_write(qspi, CHIP_SELECT, 0, wr);
usleep_range(10, 20);
}
+
+ dev_dbg(&qspi->pdev->dev, "using cs:%d\n", cs);
qspi->curr_cs = cs;
}
@@ -770,8 +773,13 @@ static int write_to_hw(struct bcm_qspi *qspi, struct spi_device *spi)
dev_dbg(&qspi->pdev->dev, "WR %04x\n", val);
}
mspi_cdram = MSPI_CDRAM_CONT_BIT;
- mspi_cdram |= (~(1 << spi->chip_select) &
- MSPI_CDRAM_PCS);
+
+ if (has_bspi(qspi))
+ mspi_cdram &= ~1;
+ else
+ mspi_cdram |= (~(1 << spi->chip_select) &
+ MSPI_CDRAM_PCS);
+
mspi_cdram |= ((tp.trans->bits_per_word <= 8) ? 0 :
MSPI_CDRAM_BITSE_BIT);
diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.h b/drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.h
index ce31b8199bb3..b8e004d1467b 100644
--- a/drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.h
+++ b/drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ struct driver_data {
/* SSP register addresses */
void __iomem *ioaddr;
- u32 ssdr_physical;
+ phys_addr_t ssdr_physical;
/* SSP masks*/
u32 dma_cr1;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub.h b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub.h
index 910f027773aa..84c0599b45b7 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub.h
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct bus_id_priv {
struct stub_device *sdev;
struct usb_device *udev;
char shutdown_busid;
+ spinlock_t busid_lock;
};
/* stub_priv is allocated from stub_priv_cache */
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ extern struct usb_device_driver stub_driver;
/* stub_main.c */
struct bus_id_priv *get_busid_priv(const char *busid);
+void put_busid_priv(struct bus_id_priv *bid);
int del_match_busid(char *busid);
void stub_device_cleanup_urbs(struct stub_device *sdev);
diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c
index 3550224f4d69..8e629b6a6f3f 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c
@@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device *udev)
struct stub_device *sdev = NULL;
const char *udev_busid = dev_name(&udev->dev);
struct bus_id_priv *busid_priv;
- int rc;
+ int rc = 0;
- dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Enter\n");
+ dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Enter probe\n");
/* check we should claim or not by busid_table */
busid_priv = get_busid_priv(udev_busid);
@@ -331,13 +331,15 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device *udev)
* other matched drivers by the driver core.
* See driver_probe_device() in driver/base/dd.c
*/
- return -ENODEV;
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto call_put_busid_priv;
}
if (udev->descriptor.bDeviceClass == USB_CLASS_HUB) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "%s is a usb hub device... skip!\n",
udev_busid);
- return -ENODEV;
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto call_put_busid_priv;
}
if (!strcmp(udev->bus->bus_name, "vhci_hcd")) {
@@ -345,13 +347,16 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device *udev)
"%s is attached on vhci_hcd... skip!\n",
udev_busid);
- return -ENODEV;
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto call_put_busid_priv;
}
/* ok, this is my device */
sdev = stub_device_alloc(udev);
- if (!sdev)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!sdev) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto call_put_busid_priv;
+ }
dev_info(&udev->dev,
"usbip-host: register new device (bus %u dev %u)\n",
@@ -383,7 +388,9 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device *udev)
}
busid_priv->status = STUB_BUSID_ALLOC;
- return 0;
+ rc = 0;
+ goto call_put_busid_priv;
+
err_files:
usb_hub_release_port(udev->parent, udev->portnum,
(struct usb_dev_state *) udev);
@@ -393,6 +400,9 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device *udev)
busid_priv->sdev = NULL;
stub_device_free(sdev);
+
+call_put_busid_priv:
+ put_busid_priv(busid_priv);
return rc;
}
@@ -418,7 +428,7 @@ static void stub_disconnect(struct usb_device *udev)
struct bus_id_priv *busid_priv;
int rc;
- dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Enter\n");
+ dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Enter disconnect\n");
busid_priv = get_busid_priv(udev_busid);
if (!busid_priv) {
@@ -431,7 +441,7 @@ static void stub_disconnect(struct usb_device *udev)
/* get stub_device */
if (!sdev) {
dev_err(&udev->dev, "could not get device");
- return;
+ goto call_put_busid_priv;
}
dev_set_drvdata(&udev->dev, NULL);
@@ -446,12 +456,12 @@ static void stub_disconnect(struct usb_device *udev)
(struct usb_dev_state *) udev);
if (rc) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "unable to release port\n");
- return;
+ goto call_put_busid_priv;
}
/* If usb reset is called from event handler */
if (usbip_in_eh(current))
- return;
+ goto call_put_busid_priv;
/* shutdown the current connection */
shutdown_busid(busid_priv);
@@ -462,12 +472,11 @@ static void stub_disconnect(struct usb_device *udev)
busid_priv->sdev = NULL;
stub_device_free(sdev);
- if (busid_priv->status == STUB_BUSID_ALLOC) {
+ if (busid_priv->status == STUB_BUSID_ALLOC)
busid_priv->status = STUB_BUSID_ADDED;
- } else {
- busid_priv->status = STUB_BUSID_OTHER;
- del_match_busid((char *)udev_busid);
- }
+
+call_put_busid_priv:
+ put_busid_priv(busid_priv);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PM
diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c
index f761e02e75c9..fa90496ca7a8 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#define DRIVER_DESC "USB/IP Host Driver"
struct kmem_cache *stub_priv_cache;
+
/*
* busid_tables defines matching busids that usbip can grab. A user can change
* dynamically what device is locally used and what device is exported to a
@@ -39,6 +40,8 @@ static spinlock_t busid_table_lock;
static void init_busid_table(void)
{
+ int i;
+
/*
* This also sets the bus_table[i].status to
* STUB_BUSID_OTHER, which is 0.
@@ -46,6 +49,9 @@ static void init_busid_table(void)
memset(busid_table, 0, sizeof(busid_table));
spin_lock_init(&busid_table_lock);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++)
+ spin_lock_init(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
}
/*
@@ -57,15 +63,20 @@ static int get_busid_idx(const char *busid)
int i;
int idx = -1;
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) {
+ spin_lock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
if (busid_table[i].name[0])
if (!strncmp(busid_table[i].name, busid, BUSID_SIZE)) {
idx = i;
+ spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
break;
}
+ spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
+ }
return idx;
}
+/* Returns holding busid_lock. Should call put_busid_priv() to unlock */
struct bus_id_priv *get_busid_priv(const char *busid)
{
int idx;
@@ -73,13 +84,22 @@ struct bus_id_priv *get_busid_priv(const char *busid)
spin_lock(&busid_table_lock);
idx = get_busid_idx(busid);
- if (idx >= 0)
+ if (idx >= 0) {
bid = &(busid_table[idx]);
+ /* get busid_lock before returning */
+ spin_lock(&bid->busid_lock);
+ }
spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);
return bid;
}
+void put_busid_priv(struct bus_id_priv *bid)
+{
+ if (bid)
+ spin_unlock(&bid->busid_lock);
+}
+
static int add_match_busid(char *busid)
{
int i;
@@ -92,15 +112,19 @@ static int add_match_busid(char *busid)
goto out;
}
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) {
+ spin_lock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
if (!busid_table[i].name[0]) {
strlcpy(busid_table[i].name, busid, BUSID_SIZE);
if ((busid_table[i].status != STUB_BUSID_ALLOC) &&
(busid_table[i].status != STUB_BUSID_REMOV))
busid_table[i].status = STUB_BUSID_ADDED;
ret = 0;
+ spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
break;
}
+ spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);
@@ -121,6 +145,8 @@ int del_match_busid(char *busid)
/* found */
ret = 0;
+ spin_lock(&busid_table[idx].busid_lock);
+
if (busid_table[idx].status == STUB_BUSID_OTHER)
memset(busid_table[idx].name, 0, BUSID_SIZE);
@@ -128,6 +154,7 @@ int del_match_busid(char *busid)
(busid_table[idx].status != STUB_BUSID_ADDED))
busid_table[idx].status = STUB_BUSID_REMOV;
+ spin_unlock(&busid_table[idx].busid_lock);
out:
spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);
@@ -140,9 +167,12 @@ static ssize_t show_match_busid(struct device_driver *drv, char *buf)
char *out = buf;
spin_lock(&busid_table_lock);
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) {
+ spin_lock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
if (busid_table[i].name[0])
out += sprintf(out, "%s ", busid_table[i].name);
+ spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
+ }
spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);
out += sprintf(out, "\n");
@@ -184,6 +214,51 @@ static ssize_t store_match_busid(struct device_driver *dev, const char *buf,
static DRIVER_ATTR(match_busid, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, show_match_busid,
store_match_busid);
+static int do_rebind(char *busid, struct bus_id_priv *busid_priv)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* device_attach() callers should hold parent lock for USB */
+ if (busid_priv->udev->dev.parent)
+ device_lock(busid_priv->udev->dev.parent);
+ ret = device_attach(&busid_priv->udev->dev);
+ if (busid_priv->udev->dev.parent)
+ device_unlock(busid_priv->udev->dev.parent);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ dev_err(&busid_priv->udev->dev, "rebind failed\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void stub_device_rebind(void)
+{
+#if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_USBIP_HOST)
+ struct bus_id_priv *busid_priv;
+ int i;
+
+ /* update status to STUB_BUSID_OTHER so probe ignores the device */
+ spin_lock(&busid_table_lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) {
+ if (busid_table[i].name[0] &&
+ busid_table[i].shutdown_busid) {
+ busid_priv = &(busid_table[i]);
+ busid_priv->status = STUB_BUSID_OTHER;
+ }
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);
+
+ /* now run rebind - no need to hold locks. driver files are removed */
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) {
+ if (busid_table[i].name[0] &&
+ busid_table[i].shutdown_busid) {
+ busid_priv = &(busid_table[i]);
+ do_rebind(busid_table[i].name, busid_priv);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
static ssize_t rebind_store(struct device_driver *dev, const char *buf,
size_t count)
{
@@ -201,16 +276,17 @@ static ssize_t rebind_store(struct device_driver *dev, const char *buf,
if (!bid)
return -ENODEV;
- /* device_attach() callers should hold parent lock for USB */
- if (bid->udev->dev.parent)
- device_lock(bid->udev->dev.parent);
- ret = device_attach(&bid->udev->dev);
- if (bid->udev->dev.parent)
- device_unlock(bid->udev->dev.parent);
- if (ret < 0) {
- dev_err(&bid->udev->dev, "rebind failed\n");
+ /* mark the device for deletion so probe ignores it during rescan */
+ bid->status = STUB_BUSID_OTHER;
+ /* release the busid lock */
+ put_busid_priv(bid);
+
+ ret = do_rebind((char *) buf, bid);
+ if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- }
+
+ /* delete device from busid_table */
+ del_match_busid((char *) buf);
return count;
}
@@ -333,6 +409,9 @@ static void __exit usbip_host_exit(void)
*/
usb_deregister_device_driver(&stub_driver);
+ /* initiate scan to attach devices */
+ stub_device_rebind();
+
kmem_cache_destroy(stub_priv_cache);
}
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
index f6ba165d3f81..409b12392474 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
@@ -2486,10 +2486,8 @@ read_block_for_search(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
if (p->reada != READA_NONE)
reada_for_search(root, p, level, slot, key->objectid);
- btrfs_release_path(p);
-
ret = -EAGAIN;
- tmp = read_tree_block(root, blocknr, 0);
+ tmp = read_tree_block(root, blocknr, gen);
if (!IS_ERR(tmp)) {
/*
* If the read above didn't mark this buffer up to date,
@@ -2503,6 +2501,8 @@ read_block_for_search(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
} else {
ret = PTR_ERR(tmp);
}
+
+ btrfs_release_path(p);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c b/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
index 52401732cddc..c65350e5119c 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
@@ -4614,6 +4614,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct extent_map_tree *em_tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->extent_tree;
u64 logged_isize = 0;
bool need_log_inode_item = true;
+ bool xattrs_logged = false;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
@@ -4918,6 +4919,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
err = btrfs_log_all_xattrs(trans, root, inode, path, dst_path);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
+ xattrs_logged = true;
if (max_key.type >= BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY && !fast_search) {
btrfs_release_path(path);
btrfs_release_path(dst_path);
@@ -4930,6 +4932,11 @@ static int btrfs_log_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
btrfs_release_path(dst_path);
if (need_log_inode_item) {
err = log_inode_item(trans, log, dst_path, inode);
+ if (!err && !xattrs_logged) {
+ err = btrfs_log_all_xattrs(trans, root, inode, path,
+ dst_path);
+ btrfs_release_path(path);
+ }
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
index 4730ba2cc049..c2495cde26f6 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
@@ -3966,6 +3966,15 @@ int btrfs_resume_balance_async(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * A ro->rw remount sequence should continue with the paused balance
+ * regardless of who pauses it, system or the user as of now, so set
+ * the resume flag.
+ */
+ spin_lock(&fs_info->balance_lock);
+ fs_info->balance_ctl->flags |= BTRFS_BALANCE_RESUME;
+ spin_unlock(&fs_info->balance_lock);
+
tsk = kthread_run(balance_kthread, fs_info, "btrfs-balance");
return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(tsk);
}
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 794b52a6c20d..94f83e74db24 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
#include <linux/delayacct.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
@@ -345,8 +346,32 @@ static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "Seccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
- seq_putc(m, '\n');
#endif
+ seq_printf(m, "\nSpeculation_Store_Bypass:\t");
+ switch (arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(p, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS)) {
+ case -EINVAL:
+ seq_printf(m, "unknown");
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED:
+ seq_printf(m, "not vulnerable");
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+ seq_printf(m, "thread force mitigated");
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ seq_printf(m, "thread mitigated");
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+ seq_printf(m, "thread vulnerable");
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ seq_printf(m, "globally mitigated");
+ break;
+ default:
+ seq_printf(m, "vulnerable");
+ break;
+ }
+ seq_putc(m, '\n');
}
static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m,
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index 2f475ad89a0d..917829b27350 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index cba7177cbec7..80b1b8faf503 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -380,8 +380,8 @@ typedef struct {
u32 attributes;
u32 get_bar_attributes;
u32 set_bar_attributes;
- uint64_t romsize;
- void *romimage;
+ u64 romsize;
+ u32 romimage;
} efi_pci_io_protocol_32;
typedef struct {
@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ typedef struct {
u64 attributes;
u64 get_bar_attributes;
u64 set_bar_attributes;
- uint64_t romsize;
- void *romimage;
+ u64 romsize;
+ u64 romimage;
} efi_pci_io_protocol_64;
typedef struct {
diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
index e791ebc65c9c..0c5ef54fd416 100644
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
#define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H
#include <asm/barrier.h>
+struct task_struct;
+
/**
* array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
* @index: array element index
@@ -55,4 +57,12 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
\
(typeof(_i)) (_i & _mask); \
})
+
+/* Speculation control prctl */
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which);
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
+ unsigned long ctrl);
+/* Speculation control for seccomp enforced mitigation */
+void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task);
+
#endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index c549c8c9245c..5ebef8c86c26 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -2354,6 +2354,8 @@ static inline void memalloc_noio_restore(unsigned int flags)
#define PFA_SPREAD_PAGE 1 /* Spread page cache over cpuset */
#define PFA_SPREAD_SLAB 2 /* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */
#define PFA_LMK_WAITING 3 /* Lowmemorykiller is waiting */
+#define PFA_SPEC_SSB_DISABLE 4 /* Speculative Store Bypass disabled */
+#define PFA_SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE 5 /* Speculative Store Bypass force disabled*/
#define TASK_PFA_TEST(name, func) \
@@ -2380,6 +2382,13 @@ TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPREAD_SLAB, spread_slab)
TASK_PFA_TEST(LMK_WAITING, lmk_waiting)
TASK_PFA_SET(LMK_WAITING, lmk_waiting)
+TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable)
+TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable)
+TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable)
+
+TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable)
+TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable)
+
/*
* task->jobctl flags
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index ecc296c137cd..50c460a956f1 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
#include <uapi/linux/seccomp.h>
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK (SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK (SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC | \
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
diff --git a/include/linux/signal.h b/include/linux/signal.h
index b63f63eaa39c..5308304993be 100644
--- a/include/linux/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/signal.h
@@ -97,6 +97,23 @@ static inline int sigisemptyset(sigset_t *set)
}
}
+static inline int sigequalsets(const sigset_t *set1, const sigset_t *set2)
+{
+ switch (_NSIG_WORDS) {
+ case 4:
+ return (set1->sig[3] == set2->sig[3]) &&
+ (set1->sig[2] == set2->sig[2]) &&
+ (set1->sig[1] == set2->sig[1]) &&
+ (set1->sig[0] == set2->sig[0]);
+ case 2:
+ return (set1->sig[1] == set2->sig[1]) &&
+ (set1->sig[0] == set2->sig[0]);
+ case 1:
+ return set1->sig[0] == set2->sig[0];
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
#define sigmask(sig) (1UL << ((sig) - 1))
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_SIG_SETOPS
diff --git a/include/trace/events/xen.h b/include/trace/events/xen.h
index bce990f5a35d..d6be935caa50 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/xen.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/xen.h
@@ -377,22 +377,6 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(xen_mmu_pgd,
DEFINE_XEN_MMU_PGD_EVENT(xen_mmu_pgd_pin);
DEFINE_XEN_MMU_PGD_EVENT(xen_mmu_pgd_unpin);
-TRACE_EVENT(xen_mmu_flush_tlb_all,
- TP_PROTO(int x),
- TP_ARGS(x),
- TP_STRUCT__entry(__array(char, x, 0)),
- TP_fast_assign((void)x),
- TP_printk("%s", "")
- );
-
-TRACE_EVENT(xen_mmu_flush_tlb,
- TP_PROTO(int x),
- TP_ARGS(x),
- TP_STRUCT__entry(__array(char, x, 0)),
- TP_fast_assign((void)x),
- TP_printk("%s", "")
- );
-
TRACE_EVENT(xen_mmu_flush_tlb_single,
TP_PROTO(unsigned long addr),
TP_ARGS(addr),
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index a8d0759a9e40..64776b72e1eb 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -197,4 +197,16 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4
+/* Per task speculation control */
+#define PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL 52
+#define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53
+/* Speculation control variants */
+# define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0
+/* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */
+# define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0
+# define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0)
+# define PR_SPEC_ENABLE (1UL << 1)
+# define PR_SPEC_DISABLE (1UL << 2)
+# define PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE (1UL << 3)
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
index 0f238a43ff1e..e4acb615792b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@
#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
/* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0)
+/* In v4.14+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG is (1UL << 1) */
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (1UL << 2)
/*
* All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index af182a6df25b..3975856d476c 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -214,8 +216,11 @@ static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
return true;
}
+void __weak arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task) { }
+
static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
- unsigned long seccomp_mode)
+ unsigned long seccomp_mode,
+ unsigned long flags)
{
assert_spin_locked(&task->sighand->siglock);
@@ -225,6 +230,9 @@ static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
* filter) is set.
*/
smp_mb__before_atomic();
+ /* Assume default seccomp processes want spec flaw mitigation. */
+ if ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW) == 0)
+ arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(task);
set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
}
@@ -292,7 +300,7 @@ static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
* without dropping the locks.
*
*/
-static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(void)
+static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(unsigned long flags)
{
struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
@@ -333,7 +341,8 @@ static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(void)
* allow one thread to transition the other.
*/
if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
- seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER);
+ seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
+ flags);
}
}
@@ -452,7 +461,7 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
/* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */
if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
- seccomp_sync_threads();
+ seccomp_sync_threads(flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -712,7 +721,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
disable_TSC();
#endif
- seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, 0);
ret = 0;
out:
@@ -770,7 +779,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
/* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
prepared = NULL;
- seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, flags);
out:
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 7ebe236a5364..17428fec19b0 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -2495,6 +2495,13 @@ void __set_current_blocked(const sigset_t *newset)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ /*
+ * In case the signal mask hasn't changed, there is nothing we need
+ * to do. The current->blocked shouldn't be modified by other task.
+ */
+ if (sigequalsets(&tsk->blocked, newset))
+ return;
+
spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
__set_task_blocked(tsk, newset);
spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 89d5be418157..143cd63f1d47 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
/* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */
#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
@@ -2072,6 +2074,17 @@ static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr)
}
#endif
+int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which,
+ unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
{
@@ -2270,6 +2283,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
case PR_GET_FP_MODE:
error = GET_FP_MODE(me);
break;
+ case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
+ if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(me, arg2);
+ break;
+ case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
+ if (arg4 || arg5)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(me, arg2, arg3);
+ break;
default:
error = -EINVAL;
break;
diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c b/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
index d2a20e83ebae..22d7454b387b 100644
--- a/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
+++ b/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
@@ -610,6 +610,14 @@ static void tick_handle_oneshot_broadcast(struct clock_event_device *dev)
now = ktime_get();
/* Find all expired events */
for_each_cpu(cpu, tick_broadcast_oneshot_mask) {
+ /*
+ * Required for !SMP because for_each_cpu() reports
+ * unconditionally CPU0 as set on UP kernels.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) &&
+ cpumask_empty(tick_broadcast_oneshot_mask))
+ break;
+
td = &per_cpu(tick_cpu_device, cpu);
if (td->evtdev->next_event.tv64 <= now.tv64) {
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, tmpmask);
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index 86e3e0e74d20..ea074a9d4958 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -666,6 +666,7 @@ config DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
depends on NO_BOOTMEM && MEMORY_HOTPLUG
depends on !FLATMEM
+ depends on !NEED_PER_CPU_KM
help
Ordinarily all struct pages are initialised during early boot in a
single thread. On very large machines this can take a considerable
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
index fa3ef25441e5..762f31fb5b67 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -2200,41 +2200,46 @@ static int nf_tables_newrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk,
}
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE) {
- if (nft_is_active_next(net, old_rule)) {
- trans = nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_DELRULE,
- old_rule);
- if (trans == NULL) {
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto err2;
- }
- nft_deactivate_next(net, old_rule);
- chain->use--;
- list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list);
- } else {
+ if (!nft_is_active_next(net, old_rule)) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto err2;
}
- } else if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_APPEND)
- if (old_rule)
- list_add_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list);
- else
- list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &chain->rules);
- else {
- if (old_rule)
- list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list);
- else
- list_add_rcu(&rule->list, &chain->rules);
- }
+ trans = nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_DELRULE,
+ old_rule);
+ if (trans == NULL) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ nft_deactivate_next(net, old_rule);
+ chain->use--;
- if (nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule) == NULL) {
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto err3;
+ if (nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule) == NULL) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list);
+ } else {
+ if (nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule) == NULL) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_APPEND) {
+ if (old_rule)
+ list_add_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list);
+ else
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &chain->rules);
+ } else {
+ if (old_rule)
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list);
+ else
+ list_add_rcu(&rule->list, &chain->rules);
+ }
}
chain->use++;
return 0;
-err3:
- list_del_rcu(&rule->list);
err2:
nf_tables_rule_destroy(&ctx, rule);
err1:
diff --git a/sound/core/control_compat.c b/sound/core/control_compat.c
index 1fa70766ffab..84ee29c3b1a0 100644
--- a/sound/core/control_compat.c
+++ b/sound/core/control_compat.c
@@ -400,8 +400,7 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_add_compat(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
if (copy_from_user(&data->id, &data32->id, sizeof(data->id)) ||
copy_from_user(&data->type, &data32->type, 3 * sizeof(u32)))
goto error;
- if (get_user(data->owner, &data32->owner) ||
- get_user(data->type, &data32->type))
+ if (get_user(data->owner, &data32->owner))
goto error;
switch (data->type) {
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
index 7d3f88d90eec..4e9112001306 100644
--- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
@@ -2061,6 +2061,8 @@ static struct snd_pci_quirk power_save_blacklist[] = {
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1849, 0x0c0c, "Asrock B85M-ITX", 0),
/* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1525104 */
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x8733, "Asus Prime X370-Pro", 0),
+ /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1572975 */
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x36a7, "Lenovo C50 All in one", 0),
/* https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198611 */
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x2227, "Lenovo X1 Carbon 3rd Gen", 0),
{}
diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer.c b/sound/usb/mixer.c
index dedf8eb4570e..db8404e31fae 100644
--- a/sound/usb/mixer.c
+++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c
@@ -905,6 +905,14 @@ static void volume_control_quirks(struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval,
}
break;
+ case USB_ID(0x0d8c, 0x0103):
+ if (!strcmp(kctl->id.name, "PCM Playback Volume")) {
+ usb_audio_info(chip,
+ "set volume quirk for CM102-A+/102S+\n");
+ cval->min = -256;
+ }
+ break;
+
case USB_ID(0x0471, 0x0101):
case USB_ID(0x0471, 0x0104):
case USB_ID(0x0471, 0x0105):
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
index f68998149351..d5be7b5ff899 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
@@ -1692,7 +1692,11 @@ TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRACE_syscall, kill_after_ptrace, SIGSYS)
#endif
#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (1UL << 2)
#endif
#ifndef seccomp
@@ -1791,6 +1795,78 @@ TEST(seccomp_syscall_mode_lock)
}
}
+/*
+ * Test detection of known and unknown filter flags. Userspace needs to be able
+ * to check if a filter flag is supported by the current kernel and a good way
+ * of doing that is by attempting to enter filter mode, with the flag bit in
+ * question set, and a NULL pointer for the _args_ parameter. EFAULT indicates
+ * that the flag is valid and EINVAL indicates that the flag is invalid.
+ */
+TEST(detect_seccomp_filter_flags)
+{
+ unsigned int flags[] = { SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW };
+ unsigned int flag, all_flags;
+ int i;
+ long ret;
+
+ /* Test detection of known-good filter flags */
+ for (i = 0, all_flags = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(flags); i++) {
+ int bits = 0;
+
+ flag = flags[i];
+ /* Make sure the flag is a single bit! */
+ while (flag) {
+ if (flag & 0x1)
+ bits ++;
+ flag >>= 1;
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, bits);
+ flag = flags[i];
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to detect that a known-good filter flag (0x%X) is supported!",
+ flag);
+ }
+
+ all_flags |= flag;
+ }
+
+ /* Test detection of all known-good filter flags */
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, all_flags, NULL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to detect that all known-good filter flags (0x%X) are supported!",
+ all_flags);
+ }
+
+ /* Test detection of an unknown filter flag */
+ flag = -1;
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to detect that an unknown filter flag (0x%X) is unsupported!",
+ flag);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Test detection of an unknown filter flag that may simply need to be
+ * added to this test
+ */
+ flag = flags[ARRAY_SIZE(flags) - 1] << 1;
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to detect that an unknown filter flag (0x%X) is unsupported! Does a new flag need to be added to this test?",
+ flag);
+ }
+}
+
TEST(TSYNC_first)
{
struct sock_filter filter[] = {
diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c b/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c
index 31f562507915..1ebbf233de9a 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c
@@ -208,8 +208,8 @@ static int update_lpi_config(struct kvm *kvm, struct vgic_irq *irq,
u8 prop;
int ret;
- ret = kvm_read_guest(kvm, propbase + irq->intid - GIC_LPI_OFFSET,
- &prop, 1);
+ ret = kvm_read_guest_lock(kvm, propbase + irq->intid - GIC_LPI_OFFSET,
+ &prop, 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -339,8 +339,9 @@ static int its_sync_lpi_pending_table(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* this very same byte in the last iteration. Reuse that.
*/
if (byte_offset != last_byte_offset) {
- ret = kvm_read_guest(vcpu->kvm, pendbase + byte_offset,
- &pendmask, 1);
+ ret = kvm_read_guest_lock(vcpu->kvm,
+ pendbase + byte_offset,
+ &pendmask, 1);
if (ret) {
kfree(intids);
return ret;
@@ -628,7 +629,7 @@ static bool vgic_its_check_id(struct vgic_its *its, u64 baser, int id)
return false;
/* Each 1st level entry is represented by a 64-bit value. */
- if (kvm_read_guest(its->dev->kvm,
+ if (kvm_read_guest_lock(its->dev->kvm,
BASER_ADDRESS(baser) + index * sizeof(indirect_ptr),
&indirect_ptr, sizeof(indirect_ptr)))
return false;
@@ -1152,8 +1153,8 @@ static void vgic_its_process_commands(struct kvm *kvm, struct vgic_its *its)
cbaser = CBASER_ADDRESS(its->cbaser);
while (its->cwriter != its->creadr) {
- int ret = kvm_read_guest(kvm, cbaser + its->creadr,
- cmd_buf, ITS_CMD_SIZE);
+ int ret = kvm_read_guest_lock(kvm, cbaser + its->creadr,
+ cmd_buf, ITS_CMD_SIZE);
/*
* If kvm_read_guest() fails, this could be due to the guest
* programming a bogus value in CBASER or something else going
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