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Message-Id: <20180523232538.4880-4-ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Wed, 23 May 2018 18:25:36 -0500
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
To: Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Subject: [REVIEW][PATCH 4/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb()
Superblock level remounts are currently restricted to global
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as is the path for changing the root mount to
read only on umount. Loosen both of these permission checks to
also allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in any namespace which is privileged
towards the userns which originally mounted the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
---
fs/namespace.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 5f75969adff1..8ddd14806799 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1590,7 +1590,7 @@ static int do_umount(struct mount *mnt, int flags)
* Special case for "unmounting" root ...
* we just try to remount it readonly.
*/
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
@@ -2333,7 +2333,7 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int ms_flags, int sb_flags,
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (ms_flags & MS_BIND)
err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, ms_flags);
- else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ else if (!ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
err = -EPERM;
else
err = do_remount_sb(sb, sb_flags, data, 0);
--
2.14.1
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