linux-kernel - YAaioRace (was Re: [PATCH 08/31] aio: implement IOCB_CMD

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Message-ID: <20180523014318.GI30522@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date:   Wed, 23 May 2018 02:43:18 +0100
From:   Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Avi Kivity <avi@...lladb.com>, linux-aio@...ck.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@...il.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Subject: YAaioRace (was Re: [PATCH 08/31] aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL)

On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 01:49:04AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:

> > Looks like we want to call ->ki_cancel() *BEFORE* removing from the list,
> > as well as doing fput() after aio_complete().  The same ordering, BTW, goes
> > for aio_read() et.al.
> > 
> > Look:
> > CPU1:	io_cancel() grabs ->ctx_lock, finds iocb and removes it from the list.
> > CPU2:	aio_rw_complete() on that iocb.  Since the sucker is not in the list
> > anymore, we do NOT spin on ->ctx_lock and proceed to free iocb
> > CPU1:	pass freed iocb to ->ki_cancel().  BOOM.
> 
> BTW, it seems that the mainline is vulnerable to this one.  I might be
> missing something, but...

It is, but with a different attack vector - io_cancel(2) won't do it (it
does not remove from the list at all), but io_destroy(2) bloody well will.

IMO, we need this in mainline; unless somebody has a problem with it, to
#fixes it goes:

fix io_destroy()/aio_complete() race

If io_destroy() gets to cancelling everything that can be cancelled and
gets to kiocb_cancel() calling the function driver has left in ->ki_cancel,
it becomes vulnerable to a race with IO completion.  At that point req
is already taken off the list and aio_complete() does *NOT* spin until
we (in free_ioctx_users()) releases ->ctx_lock.  As the result, it proceeds
to kiocb_free(), freing req just it gets passed to ->ki_cancel().

Fix is simple - remove from the list after the call of kiocb_cancel().  All
instances of ->ki_cancel() already have to cope with the being called with
iocb still on list - that's what happens in io_cancel(2).

Cc: stable@...nel.org
Fixes: 0460fef2a921 "aio: use cancellation list lazily"
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
---
diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index 8061d9787e54..49f53516eef0 100644
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -634,9 +634,8 @@ static void free_ioctx_users(struct percpu_ref *ref)
 	while (!list_empty(&ctx->active_reqs)) {
 		req = list_first_entry(&ctx->active_reqs,
 				       struct aio_kiocb, ki_list);
-
-		list_del_init(&req->ki_list);
 		kiocb_cancel(req);
+		list_del_init(&req->ki_list);
 	}

 	spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);