[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <833776ac-2b8c-b0f7-dcff-9c55afd67c65@arm.com>
Date: Thu, 24 May 2018 13:16:38 +0100
From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/14] arm64: ssbd: Introduce thread flag to control
userspace mitigation
On 24/05/18 13:01, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Tue, May 22, 2018 at 04:06:43PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
>> In order to allow userspace to be mitigated on demand, let's
>> introduce a new thread flag that prevents the mitigation from
>> being turned off when exiting to userspace, and doesn't turn
>> it on on entry into the kernel (with the assumtion that the
>
> Nit: s/assumtion/assumption/
>
>> mitigation is always enabled in the kernel itself).
>>
>> This will be used by a prctl interface introduced in a later
>> patch.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>
>
> On the assumption that this flag cannot be flipped while a task is in
> userspace:
Well, that's the case unless you get into the seccomp thing, which does
change TIF_SSBD on all threads of the task, without taking it to the
kernel first. That nicely breaks the state machine, and you end-up
running non-mitigated in the kernel. Oops.
I have a couple of patches fixing that, using a second flag
(TIF_SSBD_PENDING) that gets turned into the real thing on exit to
userspace. It's pretty ugly though.
Thanks,
M.
--
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...
Powered by blists - more mailing lists