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Message-Id: <1527237099-9728-1-git-send-email-sgrover@codeaurora.org>
Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 14:01:39 +0530
From: Sachin Grover <sgrover@...eaurora.org>
To: paul@...l-moore.com, sds@...ho.nsa.gov
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
Sachin Grover <sgrover@...eaurora.org>
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecurity
Call trace:
[<ffffff9203a8d7a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428
[<ffffff9203a8dbf8>] show_stack+0x28/0x38
[<ffffff920409bfb8>] dump_stack+0xd4/0x124
[<ffffff9203d187e8>] print_address_description+0x68/0x258
[<ffffff9203d18c00>] kasan_report.part.2+0x228/0x2f0
[<ffffff9203d1927c>] kasan_report+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffff9203d1776c>] check_memory_region+0x12c/0x1c0
[<ffffff9203d17cdc>] memcpy+0x34/0x68
[<ffffff9203d75348>] xattr_getsecurity+0xe0/0x160
[<ffffff9203d75490>] vfs_getxattr+0xc8/0x120
[<ffffff9203d75d68>] getxattr+0x100/0x2c8
[<ffffff9203d76fb4>] SyS_fgetxattr+0x64/0xa0
[<ffffff9203a83f70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
If user get root access and calls security.selinux setxattr() with an
embedded NUL on a file and then if some process performs a getxattr()
on that file with a length greater than the actual length of the string,
it would result in a panic.
To fix this, add the actual length of the string to the security context
instead of the length passed by the userspace process.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Grover <sgrover@...eaurora.org>
---
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 66ea81c..d17f5b4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1434,7 +1434,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
context.str = str;
- context.len = scontext_len;
+ context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
str = NULL;
} else if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
--
1.9.1
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