Date:   Fri, 25 May 2018 01:05:56 +0100
From:   David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To:     viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Cc:     dhowells@...hat.com, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-afs@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/32] selinux: Implement the new mount API LSM hooks [ver
 #8]

Implement the new mount API LSM hooks for SELinux.  At some point the old
hooks will need to be removed.

Question: Should the ->fs_context_parse_source() hook be implemented to
check the labels on any source devices specified?

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
cc: selinux@...ho.nsa.gov
cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
---

 security/selinux/hooks.c |  262 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 262 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 54ecb1c18ca1..1ab74c5ae789 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -2971,6 +2972,259 @@ static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 				   FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
 }
 
+/* fsopen mount context operations */
+
+static int selinux_fs_context_alloc(struct fs_context *fc,
+				    struct dentry *reference)
+{
+	struct security_mnt_opts *opts;
+
+	opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!opts)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	fc->security = opts;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
+				  struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+	const struct security_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
+	struct security_mnt_opts *opts;
+	int i, n;
+
+	opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!opts)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	fc->security = opts;
+
+	if (!src || !src->num_mnt_opts)
+		return 0;
+	n = opts->num_mnt_opts = src->num_mnt_opts;
+
+	if (src->mnt_opts) {
+		opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(n, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!opts->mnt_opts)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+			if (src->mnt_opts[i]) {
+				opts->mnt_opts[i] = kstrdup(src->mnt_opts[i],
+							    GFP_KERNEL);
+				if (!opts->mnt_opts[i])
+					return -ENOMEM;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (src->mnt_opts_flags) {
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags = kmemdup(src->mnt_opts_flags,
+					       n * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	struct security_mnt_opts *opts = fc->security;
+
+	security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
+	fc->security = NULL;
+}
+
+static int selinux_fs_context_parse_option(struct fs_context *fc, char *opt, size_t len)
+{
+	struct security_mnt_opts *opts = fc->security;
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+	unsigned int have;
+	char *c, **oo;
+	int token, ctx, i, *of;
+
+	token = match_token(opt, tokens, args);
+	if (token == Opt_error)
+		return 0; /* Doesn't belong to us. */
+
+	have = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++)
+		have |= 1 << opts->mnt_opts_flags[i];
+	if (have & (1 << token))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	switch (token) {
+	case Opt_context:
+		if (have & (1 << Opt_defcontext))
+			goto incompatible;
+		ctx = CONTEXT_MNT;
+		goto copy_context_string;
+
+	case Opt_fscontext:
+		ctx = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
+		goto copy_context_string;
+
+	case Opt_rootcontext:
+		ctx = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+		goto copy_context_string;
+
+	case Opt_defcontext:
+		if (have & (1 << Opt_context))
+			goto incompatible;
+		ctx = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+		goto copy_context_string;
+
+	case Opt_labelsupport:
+		return 1;
+
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+copy_context_string:
+	if (opts->num_mnt_opts > 3)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	of = krealloc(opts->mnt_opts_flags,
+		      (opts->num_mnt_opts + 1) * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!of)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	of[opts->num_mnt_opts] = 0;
+	opts->mnt_opts_flags = of;
+
+	oo = krealloc(opts->mnt_opts,
+		      (opts->num_mnt_opts + 1) * sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!oo)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	oo[opts->num_mnt_opts] = NULL;
+	opts->mnt_opts = oo;
+
+	c = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+	if (!c)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	opts->mnt_opts[opts->num_mnt_opts] = c;
+	opts->mnt_opts_flags[opts->num_mnt_opts] = ctx;
+	opts->num_mnt_opts++;
+	return 1;
+
+incompatible:
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate the security parameters supplied for a reconfiguration/remount
+ * event.
+ */
+static int selinux_validate_for_sb_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	struct security_mnt_opts *opts = fc->security;
+	int rc, i, *flags;
+	char **mount_options;
+
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		return 0;
+
+	mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
+	flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
+		u32 sid;
+
+		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
+			continue;
+
+		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, mount_options[i],
+						 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
+				"(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+				mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+			goto inval;
+		}
+
+		switch (flags[i]) {
+		case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
+				goto bad_option;
+			break;
+		case CONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
+				goto bad_option;
+			break;
+		case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
+			struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+			root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
+				goto bad_option;
+			break;
+		}
+		case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
+				goto bad_option;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto inval;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+bad_option:
+	pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
+		"during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n",
+		sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+inval:
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate the security context assembled from the option data supplied to
+ * mount.
+ */
+static int selinux_fs_context_validate(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE)
+		return selinux_validate_for_sb_reconfigure(fc);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the security context on a superblock.
+ */
+static int selinux_sb_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(fc->root->d_sb, fc->security, 0, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
+	if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT)
+		return 0;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = fc->root;
+	return superblock_has_perm(cred, fc->root->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_mountpoint(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
+				 unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return path_has_perm(cred, mountpoint, FILE__MOUNTON);
+}
+
 /* inode security operations */
 
 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
@@ -6882,6 +7136,14 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
 
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_alloc, selinux_fs_context_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_free, selinux_fs_context_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_option, selinux_fs_context_parse_option),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_validate, selinux_fs_context_validate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_get_tree, selinux_sb_get_tree),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mountpoint, selinux_sb_mountpoint),
+
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),

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