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Message-ID: <871sdzy0nv.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 14:51:00 -0500
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@...il.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/7] security: rename security_kernel_read_file() hook
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> writes:
> On Thu, 24 May 2018, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
>> Below is where I suggest you start on sorting out these security hooks.
>> - Adding a security_kernel_arg to catch when you want to allow/deny the
>> use of an argument to a syscall. What security_kernel_file_read and
>> security_kernel_file_post_read have been abused for.
>
> NAK. This abstraction is too semantically weak.
>
> LSM hooks need to map to stronger semantics so we can reason about what
> the hook and the policy is supposed to be mediating.
I will take that as an extremely weak nack as all I did was expose the
existing code and what the code is currently doing. I don't see how you
can NAK what is already being merged and used.
I will be happy to see a better proposal.
The best I can see is to take each and every syscall that my patch
is calling syscall_kernel_arg and make it it's own hook without an
enumeration. I did not see any real duplication between the cases in my
enumeration so I don't think that will be a problem. Maybe a bit of a
challenge for loadpin but otherwise not.
Thank you in this for understanding why I am having problems with the
current hook.
Eric
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