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Message-ID: <1569841.KfYyxMilWs@x2>
Date: Tue, 29 May 2018 17:30:06 -0400
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>
To: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-audit@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 8/8] ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
Hello,
On Thursday, May 24, 2018 4:11:05 PM EDT Stefan Berger wrote:
> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines
> AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules.
>
> With this change we now call integrity_audit_msg_common() to get
> common integrity auditing fields. This now produces the following
> record when parsing an IMA policy rule:
>
> type=UNKNOWN[1806] msg=audit(1527004216.690:311): action=dont_measure \
> fsmagic=0x9fa0 pid=1613 uid=0 auid=0 ses=2 \
> subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 \
> op=policy_update cause=parse_rule comm="echo" exe="/usr/bin/echo" \
> tty=tty2 res=1
Since this is a new event, do you mind moving the tty field to be between
auid= and ses= ? That is the more natural place for it.
Also, it might be more natural for the op= and cause= fields to be before the
pid= portion. This doesn't matter as much to me because those are not
searchable fields and they are skipped right over. But moving the tty field
is the main comment from me.
Thanks,
-Steve
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 3 ++-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 5 +++--
> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 4e61a9e05132..776e0abd35cf 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
> #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS 1802 /* Integrity enable status */
> #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH 1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
> #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR 1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* policy rule */
> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs
> */ +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1806 /* IMA policy rules */
>
> #define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A
REQUEST. */
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 3aed25a7178a..a8ae47a386b4
> 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct
> ima_rule_entry *entry) int result = 0;
>
> ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
> - AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
>
> entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
> entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
> @@ -926,7 +926,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct
> ima_rule_entry *entry) temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
> else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK)
> temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
> - audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
> + integrity_audit_msg_common(ab, NULL, NULL,
> + "policy_update", "parse_rule", result);
> audit_log_end(ab);
> return result;
> }
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