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Message-Id: <20180601145921.9500-3-konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Jun 2018 10:59:20 -0400
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
tglx@...utronix.de, andrew.cooper3@...rix.com
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@....com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v1 2/3] x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usage
The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
mentions that if CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[24] is set we should be using
the SPEC_CTRL MSR (0x48) over the VIRT SPEC_CTRL MSR (0xC001_011f)
for speculative store bypass disable.
This in effect means we should clear the X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD
flag so that we would prefer the SPEC_CTRL MSR.
See the document titled:
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
A copy of this document is available at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
---
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@....com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++++-----
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 10 ++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 8 +++++---
5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index b6d7ce32927a..5701f5cecd31 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB (13*32+12) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS (13*32+14) /* "" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD (13*32+24) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO (13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 7416fc206b4a..6bea81855cdd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -529,18 +529,20 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
/*
- * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD uses
- * a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
+ * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD may
+ * use a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
*/
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+ x86_amd_ssb_disable();
+ break;
+ }
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
break;
- case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
- x86_amd_ssb_disable();
- break;
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 494735cf63f5..d08a29bd0385 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -783,6 +783,12 @@ static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
}
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD);
+ }
}
void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 132f8a58692e..f4f30d0c25c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -379,7 +379,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
/* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */
const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features =
- F(AMD_IBPB) | F(AMD_IBRS) | F(VIRT_SSBD) | F(AMD_SSB_NO);
+ F(AMD_IBPB) | F(AMD_IBRS) | F(AMD_SSBD) | F(VIRT_SSBD) |
+ F(AMD_SSB_NO);
/* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */
const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features =
@@ -664,7 +665,12 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
entry->ebx |= F(VIRT_SSBD);
entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features;
cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
+ /*
+ * The preference is to use SPEC CTRL MSR instead of the
+ * VIRT_SPEC MSR.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
entry->ebx |= F(VIRT_SSBD);
break;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 26110c202b19..950ec50f77c3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -4115,7 +4115,8 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
break;
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS) &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
return 1;
msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
@@ -4217,11 +4218,12 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
break;
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS) &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
return 1;
/* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
- if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP))
+ if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
return 1;
svm->spec_ctrl = data;
--
2.13.4
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